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Establishing, Implementing and Auditing Linux Operating System 
Hardening Standard for Security Compliance 
Abstract: 
Regulations create challenges to the companies as they must meet tough security standards 
for security compliance every year. Not following security standards are making companies 
more vulnerable to cyber threats. This paper provides a proof-of-concept solution for being 
compliant with operating system hardening requirements of the company by establishing, 
implementing and auditing Linux (Debian) operating system hardening standard. This work 
will focus on building a hardened virtual machine image for Microsoft Azure platform that 
is compliant with the hardening standard that is established in this thesis. As it is not enough 
to just meet the company security compliance requirements, then there is a need to ensure 
auditability of it, therefore a proof-of-concept solution is built for automatically auditing the 
operating system hardening standard that continuously allows to validate the gap between 
the standard and actual configurations on virtual machines. To demonstrate the result, the 
author analysed virtual machines compliance state before and after implementing the new 
operating system hardening standard. 
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Linux operatsioonisüsteemi turvalisuse tugevdamise standardi loomine, 
implementeerimine ja auditeerimine turvavastavuseks 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Regulatsioonid loovad väljakutseid ettevõtetele, sest nad peavad igal aastal turvavastavu-
seks täitma turvastandardeid. Turvastandardite mitte järgimine teeb ettevõtted küberohtu-
dele haavatavaks. Antud magistritöö pakub lahenduse, et täita ettevõtte operatsioonisüs-
teemi tugevdamise nõudeid: luues, implementeerides ja auditeerides Linux (Debian) ope-
ratsioonisüsteemi tugevdamise turvastandardit. Magistritöö käsitleb tugevdatud virtuaalma-
sina tõmmise ehitamist Microsoft Azure pilveplatvormile, mis vastab operatsioonisüsteemi 
tugevdamise standardile. Kuna lihtsalt ettevõtte turvavastavuse nõuete täitmine ei ole piisav, 
siis tuleb tagada selle auditeeritavus, et turvavastavuse täitmist audiitoritele tõestada. Antud 
magistritöös on koostatud lahendus, mis automaatselt auditeerib operatsioonisüsteemi tu-
gevdamise standardit ja võimaldab kinnitada erinevusi standardi ja tegelike virtuaalmasinate 
konfiguratsioonide vahel. Autor on analüüsinud virtuaalmasinate turvavastavust enne ja pä-
rast uue operatsioonisüsteemi tugevdamise standardi rakendamist. 
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tiseerimine 
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1 Introduction 
Nowadays companies are providing their services and products online more and more. Com-
panies are processing sensitive information, therefore for protecting themselves and their 
customers they must meet several security standards for security compliance each year. 
Research reports show that security breaches are increasing. For example, PwC research 
2015 states that many companies have suffered due to security breaches (PwC, 2015). Ac-
cording to Verizon (2016) and Identity Theft Resource Center (2017) data breach reports, 
security breaches are still on the rise. Verizon 2015 PCI (Payment Card Industry) compli-
ance report states that many companies are still failing PCI compliance due to lack of im-
plemented controls (Oosten, Baritchi & Koten, 2015). These research results clearly show 
that security compliance is important but not easy to achieve - having clear security stand-
ards, implementing and auditing these standards should be vital for any industry for mini-
mizing the risks against cyber threats. 
Cloud computing is widely used these days, mostly because it allows companies deliver 
products much faster and with smaller effort. However, based on our experience, standard 
Linux distribution images in the cloud are not built for security by default nor they are hard-
ened against any known security standards or guidelines. Therefore, this thesis explores 
possibility to build a hardened Debian Linux virtual machine image to ensure that any newly 
created virtual machine is compliant according to the operating system (OS) hardening 
standard which we are presenting in this thesis. As it is not enough to just implement the OS 
hardening standard requirements, we need to ensure auditability of it to provide evidence to 
the auditors. For that, an automated compliance tool is needed to verify the compliance level 
of the virtual machines. Therefore, this thesis concentrates on both – building an automated 
proof-of-concept solution for implementing and auditing the OS hardening standard using 
existing open source tools out there. 
1.1 Scope 
In this thesis, we call the list of OS hardening requirements of the holding company to “the 
holding company OS hardening standard”. To support the work in thesis, we are listing these 
hardening requirements in Appendix 1. These hardening requirements are based on publicly 
known DISA STIG (Defense Information Systems Agency Security Technical Implemen-
tation Guide) for Red Hat (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). In the reality, the 
holding company standard contains several other hardening requirements, but in thesis we 
are taking only publicly available hardening requirements based on DISA STIG for Red Hat 
in to scope due to confidentiality reasons. Therefore, we acknowledge that the holding com-
pany standard in this thesis is identical to DISA STIG for Red Hat. 
We are not going to implement all the hardening requirements in this thesis. The require-
ments that we are implementing for our proof-of-concept prototype are listed in the section 
4.4. We are implementing the solution in Microsoft Azure platform with a help of configu-
ration management tool Chef. Describing Chef and Microsoft Azure base fundamentals are 
not in scope of this thesis. We are implementing and auditing security controls which are 
technically possible, any procedural or administrative security controls are out of scope. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The author of this master thesis is working at IT company which got acquired by the holding 
company. The author’s team manages thousands of Linux Debian based servers.  
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The problem is that hardening and securing the operating system of these servers are based 
on experience of service engineers and results of internal penetration tests. There are no 
operating system hardening standards followed, while at the same time the parent company 
is under increasing pressure because of regulatory requirements of the holding company. 
The parent company must be compliant according to the holding company OS hardening 
standard which is based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense Information Systems Agency, 
2015). 
In addition, it is difficult to ensure the continuous compliance, because the company doesn’t 
have an automated solution that lets, on regular basis, validate the gap between the standard 
and actual hardening configurations and practices on servers. This current process involves 
manual data collection which takes many resources and makes the author’s team situation 
difficult during the holding company internal audits. There are risks that some servers are 
not configured properly from security compliance perspective. Therefore, there is a need for 
an automated compliance tool to verify the compliance level of the parent company Linux 
servers. 
In this thesis, we aim to build a hardened Debian Linux virtual machine image which is 
compliant with the holding company regulatory requirements. This ensures that any newly 
created virtual machine is already compliant according to the standard. To accomplish this 
task, we have chosen Microsoft Azure as a platform and Chef configuration management 
tool for developing and implementing the OS hardening standard requirements. For hard-
ened image creation, we have chosen three open source tools for analysis and suitable tool 
will be chosen for the company. Finally, we will implement a solution to automatically audit 
the OS hardening standard by developing security compliance auditing tests using open 
source compliance analysis tool and analyse the findings. Before we can start implementing 
the solution, we need to find answers to the research questions for satisfying the goals of 
this thesis. 
This thesis is mainly focused on meeting security compliance of the holding company, with 
the following goals: 
1. Analyse the holding company OS hardening standard by identifying only relevant 
requirements which can be implemented on the parent company Linux Debian serv-
ers. Based on the results, establish a new OS hardening standard for the parent com-
pany. 
2. Build a proof-of-concept prototype for implementing the OS hardening standard by 
creating a hardened Debian Linux virtual machine image for Microsoft Azure plat-
form. 
3. Build a proof-of-concept prototype for automatically auditing the OS hardening 
standard.  
4. Analyse the results before and after implementing the OS hardening standard.  
The main research question of this thesis is: How to be compliant with security compliance 
requirements of the holding company? To answer to this question, we need to answer to the 
following research questions below. 
RQ1: What are the security standards and hardening guidelines for security compliance in 
industry? 
Why security compliance and OS hardening is important? 
We have discovered that there are several security standards and hardening guidelines avail-
able such as PCI DSS, HIPAA, ISO (27000 series), NIST (SP800 series) and hardening 
guidelines provided by CIS, NSA, NIST and DISA. 
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RQ2: How to establish Linux operating system hardening standard for security compliance? 
Is the holding company OS hardening standard based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015) suitable for the parent company? What hardening re-
quirements are relevant for the parent company? What hardening requirements are already 
in place and implemented? What hardening requirements are not in place? How complicated 
it is to implement hardening requirements which are not in place on the parent company 
Debian systems? 
We have identified all the relevant hardening requirements for the parent company Debian 
Linux systems from the holding company hardening standard. This allowed the author to 
establish the new hardening standard for the parent company that is used as a baseline for 
implementing the proof-of-concept solution in this thesis. 
RQ3: How to implement Linux operating system hardening standard for security compli-
ance? 
What requirements of the OS hardening standard can be implemented on the parent com-
pany Debian Linux operating systems? As we can’t implement everything, we need to an-
swer to this question and concentrate on small part that we can implement in this project. 
What virtual machine image creation tool is suitable for the parent company for preparing 
the hardened base image? What it takes to integrate Microsoft Azure platform, Chef config-
uration management and chosen image creation tool for automatically implementing the 
hardening standard? 
We have chosen Packer as suitable image creation tool. We have developed Chef cookbook 
(Appendix 2) that contains all the code for automatically implementing the hardening re-
quirements from the new standard. We have integrated this Chef cookbook with image cre-
ation tool Packer and Microsoft Azure cloud platform for creating a hardened virtual ma-
chine image. 
RQ4: How to audit Linux operating system hardening standard for security compliance? 
What solutions are there that can be used for the automated security compliance auditing 
based on the company OS hardening standard? What tool is suitable for the parent company? 
What it takes to develop security compliance checks (tests) for the OS hardening require-
ments which we have implemented in this project? 
We have chosen InSpec as suitable automated security compliance auditing tool. We have 
developed security compliance auditing tests for InSpec for automatically auditing the new 
OS hardening standard (Appendix 3). 
RQ5: How many OS hardening requirements each chosen virtual machine (VM) meets from 
the new OS hardening standard? 
For validating the proof-of-concept solution, we need to find answer to how many OS hard-
ening requirements are met on a virtual machine that was created with hardened and non-
hardened VM image. 
According to automated security compliance auditing tool InSpec scan results, we discov-
ered that 29 hardening requirements (~21%) of 138 were not met on virtual machine that 
was created with default (non-hardened) virtual machine image (Appendix 4). 
1.3 Methodology 
In order to understand the problem better, we have done background study of several data 
breach security reports. Based on these reports, we understand why security compliance is 
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important and needed. In addition, for understanding security compliance and operating sys-
tem hardening, we are exploring several books and papers. Moreover, we have done addi-
tional background study of security standards and hardening guidelines. 
To successfully address the problem and achieve our goals, we will find answers to our 
research questions. During this time, we will explore additional literature. Considering that 
there is not much research done in this field, the sources will be found mainly on internet: 
academic search engines, publications, white and grey literature, e-books, websites and 
technical documentations. 
While analysing the holding company OS hardening standard and choosing relevant hard-
ening requirements, we are using several Linux hardening books as a guideline. These books 
help us to understand the differences between Red Hat and Debian distributions and help 
the author during decision making while choosing relevant requirements.  In addition, we 
are using Linux hardening books during implementation of the hardening standard.  
Before implementing and auditing the OS hardening standard, we have done a research of 
relevant work in this field by exploring several papers, books and websites. After choosing 
a correct tooling for hardened virtual machine image creation and for security compliance 
auditing, we are installing and configuring these by following technical documentations. 
We are following Test-Driven Development (Erdogmus, Morisio, & Torchiano, 2005) soft-
ware development approach when developing our proof-of-concept hardening and auditing 
solution. While developing OS hardening requirements into configuration management tool 
Chef and developing security compliance auditing tests, we are also following guidelines 
provided for each security control in DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense Information Systems 
Agency, 2015). 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
To answer to the research questions, the thesis will be structured as follows: 
• Chapter 1. Introduction - introduces the thesis and states the problem and research 
questions that the thesis handles. 
 
• Chapter 2. Background – introduces the necessary information and background 
study for understanding the thesis project. 
 
• Chapter 3. Establishing the Operating System Hardening Standard - the holding 
company Linux hardening standard based on DISA STIG for Red Hat Linux 
(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) is being analysed and based on the 
results, answer to the second research question is done. 
 
• Chapter 4. Implementing the Operating System Hardening Standard - describes what 
it takes to create a hardened Linux Debian OS virtual machine image which is com-
pliant with the OS hardening standard. Image creation tools are analysed and proof-
of-concept solution is implemented. Answer to the third research questions is done. 
 
• Chapter 5. Auditing the Operating System Hardening Standard – for answering to 
the fourth research question, we are looking briefly what solutions are there that can 
be used as automated security compliance auditing tool. After choosing suitable 
compliance auditing tool for the parent company, proof-of-concept prototype will be 
implemented by developing compliance tests for auditing the new OS hardening 
standard.  
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• Chapter 6. Validation of Proof of Concept Solution -  to validate our solution, we 
analyse the security compliance auditing results before and after implementing the 
OS hardening standard. 
 
• Chapter 7. Conclusions and Future Work -  presents the summary, conclusions, an-
swers to the research questions and limitations of the thesis. Additional discussion 
is done in regards of the future work.  
 
• Appendix I. The Holding Company Linux Hardening Standard – contains a list of 
OS hardening requirements that are taken from DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015). 
 
• Appendix II. Chef Cookbook for Implementing the Hardening Standard – examples 
of code snippets for Chef configuration management tool for implementing the 
proof-of-concept virtual machine image. 
 
• Appendix III. InSpec Profile for Auditing the New Hardening Standard – examples 
of security compliance auditing tool InSpec code snippets for auditing the new OS 
hardening standard. 
 
• Appendix IV. Results of Validating the Proof-of-Concept Solution – detailed InSpec 
report of security compliance results before and after implementing the OS harden-
ing standard on virtual machines. 
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2 Background 
In this chapter, we will present the background information for understanding the thesis. As 
our goal in this thesis is meeting security compliance of the holding company, we will in-
troduce what security compliance is and why it is important. Since our thesis concentrates 
also to operating system hardening, we will present the meaning and importance of OS 
hardening. In addition, we describe several security standards. Moreover, DISA Red Hat 
Linux OS hardening guideline is introduced as we are using it as our baseline in this thesis. 
In this chapter, we will answer to RQ1 which is: “What are the security standards and hard-
ening guidelines for security compliance in industry?” To support answer to this question, 
we need to understand the importance of security compliance and OS hardening. 
2.1 Security Compliance 
There are several definitions for security compliance. Lustig (2015) states that "The term 
regulatory compliance refers to the adherence of an organization to the laws, specifications, 
regulations, and standards required for an industry" (p.11).  
Julisch (2009) describes security compliance as follows: “Security compliance, in IT sys-
tems, is the state of conformance with externally imposed functional security requirements 
and of providing evidence (assurance) thereof” (p.72). 
According to Lustig (2015), companies need to meet several requirements, otherwise there 
can be several negative consequences. We agree with Lustig (2015) statement: “Many reg-
ulatory standards exist to protect individuals’ and companies’ data” (p.11), therefore we will 
briefly describe several industry accepted security standards in the section 2.3. 
Several research reports claim that security incidents are increasing. The Verizon PCI Com-
pliant Report 2015 created by Oosten, Baritchi & Koten (2015), presents that companies 
who had data breach were less PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard) 
compliant than companies who met PCI DSS requirements. Therefore, based on these re-
sults, we can clearly say that security compliance is important, because it helps companies 
to achieve more security. 
2.2 Operating System Hardening 
We have found several literatures that describes operating system hardening very well. An-
dress (2014) describes operating system hardening as follows: "one of the main goals of 
operating system hardening is to reduce the number of available avenues through which our 
operating system might be attacked" (p.132). 
Bauer (2003) states that Linux operating system has historically used to be insecure by de-
fault - several Linux distributions have pre-installed applications that are not needed and 
which can be disabled. Bauer (2003) also phrases Marcus Ranum's sentence from "A Net-
work firewall" paper: "That which is not explicitly permitted is forbidden" (Ranum, 1992, 
p. 7). Bauer (2003) agrees that this sentence fits well to OS hardening. Although, the book 
and research paper is old, we agree that these thoughts are still valid – nowadays there are 
still several not needed applications pre-installed on operating systems which increase the 
attack surface. 
In addition, OS hardening is necessary to be compliant with security compliance require-
ments. For example, several industry accepted security standards require that OS hardening 
policy is followed and auditors require evidence that it is implemented accordingly. For 
example, PCI DSS requirement 2.2 states: “Develop configuration standards for all system 
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components. Assure that these standards address all known security vulnerabilities and are 
consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards” (PCI Security Standards 
Council LLC, 2016, p. 31). We are briefly describing these standards and several other hard-
ening guidelines as well in the section 2.3. 
We believe that OS hardening is important for mitigating and minimizing the risks of secu-
rity threats. 
2.3 Security Standards and Hardening Guidelines 
We have studied that data breaches are increasing these days. To protect companies and 
users, there are several industry accepted security standards available. For example, PCI 
DSS which is put together by credit card companies such as MasterCard, Visa and American 
Express (PCI Security Standards Council LLC, 2017). PCI DSS provides requirements to 
protect payment account details such as credit card numbers (PCI Security Standards 
Council LLC, 2016).  
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), sets the standard for 
protecting personal health information (Health Information Privacy, 2017). There are sev-
eral other known security standards such as ISO 27000 family standards (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2017) and NIST SP800 computer security standards (The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2017a). 
In addition, there are several industry-accepted hardening standards. The Center for Internet 
Security (CIS) is providing hardening guideline for Debian Linux systems (Center for 
Internet Security, 2017a). National Security Agency (NSA) provides detailed hardening 
guideline for Red Hat systems (National Security Agency, 2007). The same does National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2017b) and DISA (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). Moreover, 
several Linux distributions have official hardening guidelines, such as Red Hat (Jahoda, et 
al., 2016) and Debian (Peña & Reelsen, 2012). 
However, company’s systems and requirements are different, therefore choosing a right 
standard is not always straightforward. Choosing a wrong guideline could break systems. 
Therefore, in this thesis in Chapter 3, we are analysing each requirement of the holding 
company hardening standard (that is based on DISA STIG for Red Hat) before implement-
ing it in the parent company. Since we are using DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015) as a baseline in thesis, we will do a brief introduction 
of it in the next section. 
2.4 Security Technical Implementation Guide for Red Hat Linux 
As the holding company hardening standard is based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015), we are briefly describing it in this section.  
According to Defense Information Systems Agency (2015) document “Red Hat 6 STIG - 
Ver 1, Rel 7” (“U_RedHat_6_V1R7_Overview.pdf” file), the STIG for Red Hat is created 
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by NSA, Red Hat and DISA for increasing security of Department of Defense (DoD) 
(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). 
Each requirement defined in this guideline has a Severity Category Code (CAT) I, II, or III 
(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). The Figure 1 presents vulnerability severity 
category code definitions of DISA STIG for Red Hat. 
 
Figure  1. DISA Category Codes taken from the “Red Hat 6 STIG - Ver 1, Rel 7” docu-
ment “U_RedHat_6_V1R7_Overview.pdf” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) 
The requirements from DISA STIG for Red Hat are published in XCCDF (Extensible Con-
figuration Checklist Description Format) language which is published as XML file 
(“U_RedHat_6_V1R7_Manual-xccdf.xml”) that can be used by SCAP (The Security Con-
tent Automation Protocol)-based scanning tools (Defense Information Systems Agency, 
2015). There are tools and documentations available (Defense Information Systems Agency, 
2017) for getting human readable output of these XML files. DISA STIG for Red Hat con-
tains implementation and auditing guidelines for each security control (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015). 
In this thesis, we have listed the hardening requirements of the holding company based on 
DISA STIG for Red Hat in Appendix 1. In the next chapter, we are analysing each hardening 
requirement from the holding company standard for deciding whether they are suitable for 
the parent company Linux Debian systems. 
2.5 Related Work in this Field 
We have reviewed and took several Linux hardening books as a guideline (Turnbull, 2005; 
Bauer, 2003). These books help us to understand the importance of Linux OS hardening. In 
addition, they help us to understand the differences between Red Hat and Debian distribu-
tions and help the author during decision making while choosing the relevant requirements 
in the Chapter 3. Moreover, these books are helpful while implementing the requirements 
in the Chapter 4.   
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we have described the meaning and the importance of security compliance 
and operating system hardening. In addition, we have reviewed several industry accepted 
security standards such as PCI DSS, HIPAA, ISO, NIST and hardening guidelines provided 
by CIS, NSA, NIST and DISA STIG for Red Hat which is used as a baseline for implement-
ing the proof-of-concept solution in this thesis. 
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3 Establishing the Operating System Hardening Standard 
In this chapter, we are analysing the holding company hardening standard. Based on the 
analysis, the decision will be done if the parent company needs separate hardening standard. 
We will identify all relevant requirements for the parent company Debian Linux systems 
while analysing the holding company hardening standard. 
In this chapter, we will answer to RQ2 which is: “How to establish Linux operating system 
hardening standard for security compliance?” To find answer to this question, we will find 
answer to several sub-questions: “Is the holding company OS hardening standard based on 
DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) suitable for the par-
ent company? What hardening requirements are relevant for the parent company? What 
hardening requirements are already in place and implemented? What hardening require-
ments are not in place? How complicated it is to implement hardening requirements which 
are not in place on the parent company Debian systems?” 
3.1 Approach 
To achieve the first goal and answer to the RQ2 that we have stated in the section 1.2, we 
are taking the holding company hardening standard (Appendix 1) as an input for analysis. 
The holding company is IT company that acquired the parent company where the author 
works at. The holding company requires that OS hardening requirements from DISA STIG 
for Red Hat (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) must be followed in the parent 
company. 
As the parent company is using Debian Linux systems, then the author cannot be sure if Red 
Hat hardening standard is suitable for the parent company. There is also a chance that some 
hardening requirements are already in place, therefore the goal is to review and analyse the 
holding company Linux OS hardening standard (Appendix 1) and identify the relevant hard-
ening requirements. 
The author expects that there are three categories for relevant hardening requirements: 
1. Requirements that are already in place;  
2. Requirements that are not in place, but can be added easily;  
3. Requirements that are not in place, but the solution is not straightforward and needs 
discussion; 
To choose which hardening requirements go to which relevant category is based on years 
of work experience of the author. In some cases, the author was not sure which requirement 
belong to which category, therefore the author triggered specific scans over the parent com-
pany infrastructure using specific tools. Describing these tools are not in scope of this work. 
In addition, discussion was done with other teams for complex hardening requirements. To 
understand the differences between Debian and Red Hat systems and to support the analysis 
in this chapter, the author used hardening books as described in the section 2.5. 
The result of the holding company standard analysis contains relevant hardening require-
ments for the parent company Debian systems. These requirements will be used for estab-
lishing the new hardening standard for the parent company. This new standard will be taken 
as a baseline for implementing the proof-of-concept solution. 
3.2 Analysing the Holding Company Linux Hardening Standard 
In this section, the author is analysing the holding company standard that is based on DISA 
STIG for Red Hat that is published as “U_RedHat_6_V1R7_Manual-xccdf.xml” file 
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(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). We are using the approach as described in 
the section 3.1. 
To support the analysis, we have listed the holding company Linux hardening requirements 
based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) in Appendix 
1. Each requirement has a number to refer to. 
File integrity monitoring: 
The requirement 1 states that a file integrity monitoring utility Aide is required (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015). The parent company is using file integrity tool only 
on some servers and Samhain tool is used instead of Aide. The category for this requirement 
will be 2. 
Login banner: 
The requirement 2 states that a login banner must be present to warn attackers about legal 
actions (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). This requirement is already in place 
and implemented by configuration management tools. The category for this requirement 
will be 1. 
Account lockout: 
The requirement 3 states that “accounts must be locked upon 35 days of inactivity” (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015). ”Disabling inactive accounts ensures that accounts 
which may not have been responsibly removed are not available to attackers who may have 
compromised their credentials” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). This require-
ment is not in place. The author doubts if it is necessary. These days’ systems are managed 
by configuration management tools, logging manually in to systems is minimal. It conflicts 
with the parent company internal user management processes, therefore this requirement 
will be skipped. There is separate process and monitoring mechanism in place for detecting 
user accounts of people who left the company. 
“The operating system must manage information system identifiers for users and devices by 
disabling the user identifier after an organization defined time period of inactivity” (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015) states the requirement 96. As stated in the requirement 
3 – the parent company has a specific monitoring mechanism in place for detecting users 
who left the company and who’s account is still enabled on the servers, therefore this re-
quirement is in place. 
The requirements 133-134 protect against password brute force attacks. For instance, the 
requirement 133 states that the system must lock accounts after several login failures 
(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). The author’s team won’t use passwords for 
logging in to the servers, therefore these requirements are not relevant. As passwords are 
not used, then the requirements 147, 156-157, 159-163, 197-199, 167-169 are also not rele-
vant. 
Public directories: 
The requirement 4 states “all public directories must be owned by a system account” 
(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). “Allowing a user account to own a world-
writable directory is undesirable because it allows the owner of that directory to remove or 
replace any files that may be placed in the directory by other users” (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015). This requirement is in place. The category for this requirement will 
be 1. 
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The requirement 118 states “the sticky bit must be set on all public directories” (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015). “Failing to set the sticky bit on public directories al-
lows unauthorized users to delete files in the directory structure” (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015). As the author was not sure if this requirement is in place, quick 
scan was conducted. It came out that this requirement is in place on all servers. The category 
will be 1. 
Syslog: 
The requirement 5 mentions that “all Rsyslog generated log files must be owned by root” 
(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). This requirement is not in place. The parent 
company is using Syslog-ng instead of Rsyslog, but the same logic can be implemented. 
The category for this requirement will be 2. 
System command files: 
The requirement 6 states that “all system command files must be owned by root” (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015). “System binaries are executed by privileged users as 
well as system services, and restrictive permissions are necessary to ensure that their exe-
cution of these programs cannot be co-opted” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 
2015). This requirement is in place. The category for this requirement will be 1. The re-
quirement 7 states “all system command files must have mode 0755 or less permissive” 
(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). Similarly, as in the requirement 6 - it is in 
place everywhere by default. The category will be same as in the requirement 6. The re-
quirement 6 and 7 can be merged to one requirement as they are related. 
Auditd service: 
“Audit log files must be owned by root” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) to 
fulfil the requirement 8. The requirement 9 states that “Audit log files must have mode 
0640” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). Attacker could tamper the audit logs 
if file ownership and permissions are not set up correctly (Defense Information Systems 
Agency, 2015). These requirements are not in place, but can be easily added. 
The requirement 10 describes that “auditing must be enabled at boot by setting a kernel 
parameter” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). “Auditd takes care of enabling 
this for all processes which launch after it does, adding the kernel argument ensures it is set 
for every process during boot” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). This require-
ment is not in place as Auditd utility is not in use. As the author’s team is not managing 
/etc/grub.conf file with configuration management tools and as the Auditd might require a 
specific Linux kernel and some versions of Auditd might not be compatible with Linux 
Debian OS then it needs more investigation to implement it properly. The category for this 
requirement will be 3. 
The requirements 51 – 75, 90-93, 164-166 are related to Auditd utility rulesets (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015). None of the requirements are in place, because Auditd 
is not installed on any server. The category for all Auditd rulesets requirements will be 2 
except for the requirement 71 which is not relevant as the author’s team is not using SELi-
nux. All requirements of auditing system are listed in Appendix 1. 
The requirement 94 states “The operating system must back up audit records on an organi-
zation defined frequency onto a different system or media than the system being audited” 
(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). Meeting this requirement covers also the 
requirement 98. It is critical that the logs are replicated to central log server. In case of server 
compromise, the attacker could tamper local logs integrity (Defense Information Systems 
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Agency, 2015) . Having logs on central logging server is useful for forensics examination 
and investigation. In addition, several automated alerting can be done based on logs, there-
fore fulfilling this request is a must. As the author’s team, has already set up central logging 
server and it is just matter of syslog configuration change, then the category will be 2.  
Automated file system mounting tools: 
The requirement 11 states that “automated file system mounting tools must not be enabled” 
(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). “New filesystems should not be arbitrarily 
introduced via the automounter” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). This re-
quirement is in place – the author’s team is not using automounters. The category will be 1. 
IP forwarding: 
The requirement 22 states that “IP forwarding for IPv4 must not be enabled, unless the sys-
tem is a router” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). “IP forwarding permits the 
kernel to forward packets from one network interface to another” (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015). This requirement is in place on all servers by default, therefore the 
category will be 1. 
Library files: 
To fulfil the requirement 23 “library files must be owned by root” (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015). “Files from shared library directories are loaded into the address 
space of processes (including privileged ones) or of the kernel itself at runtime” (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015). This requirement is in place. The category will be 1. 
Mail relay: 
The requirement 25 mentions that “mail relaying must be restricted” (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015). “This ensures Postfix accepts mail messages (such as Cron job 
reports) from the local system only, and not from the network, which protects it from net-
work attack” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). The author’s team is using mail 
relays only on some servers, but there is ongoing project to decommission these, therefore 
this requirement is not relevant. 
Process core dumps: 
The requirement 28 states that “process core dumps must be disabled unless needed” 
(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). “A core dump includes a memory image 
taken at the time the operating system terminates an application” (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015). The author thinks that core dumps are essential in debugging C 
application crashes, therefore this requirement cannot and should not be completely disa-
bled. This needs a discussion, therefore the category will be 3. 
Password, shadow and group files: 
The requirements 37-49 are about hardening password, shadow and group files ownership 
and permissions (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). Most of them are already in 
place, except the requirement 42 and 49 which forces setting file permissions rights to 0000 
on /etc/gshadow and /etc/shadow files (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). “Fail-
ure to give ownership of this file to root provides the designated owner with access to sen-
sitive information which could weaken the system security posture” (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015). The author proposes file permission 640 or less, because these files 
are owned by root by default. To mitigate the risk of password cracking – passwords won’t 
be used in the system. The category will be 2 for the requirement 42, 49 and the category 1 
for the rest (37-41, 43-48). 
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Atd service: 
Using the Atd service is not allowed to fulfil the requirement 50 (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015). “The Atd service could be used by an unsophisticated insider to 
carry out activities outside of a normal login session, which could complicate accountabil-
ity” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). This requirement is in place – Atd is 
disabled on all servers by default. 
DCCP Protocol and DHCP Client: 
The requirement 80 states that “the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) must 
be disabled unless required” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). “Disabling 
DCCP protects the system against exploitation of any flaws in its implementation” (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015). This requirement is not in place, but can be easily 
added, therefore the category will be 2. In addition, using the DHCP (Dynamic Host Con-
figuration Protocol) client is not allowed according to the requirement 81 (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015). The author’s team is not using DHCP for setting up 
network connection on servers. The category for this requirement will be 1. 
Graphical desktop: 
The requirements 82-84, 135 are about graphical desktop environment (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015). These are not relevant, because the author’s team is 
not using graphical desktop on any servers.  
LDAP Server: 
According to the requirement 89 “The openldap-servers package must not be installed un-
less required” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). This requirement is in place – 
the author’s team is not using LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) where it 
shouldn’t be used. The author notes that this package is named Slapd in Debian Linux. 
External devices: 
The requirement 95 is about disabling access to external devices such as USB drives 
(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). This requirement is partially in place – some 
servers still allow external devices. Although the risk is low, as the attacker should have 
physical access to the servers for abusing this. There are multiple guards and other security 
processes in place to access the datacentres physically. The category will be 2. 
Firewalls: 
The requirement 97 states that “the operating system must prevent public IPv4 access into 
an organizations internal networks” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). The par-
ent company has several internal and external firewalls for protecting the internal networks. 
The requirement 97 is more about host based firewall. As the firewall devices are not man-
aged by author’s team then the author thinks it is good idea to have host based firewall as 
well – this gives better control for the team. Host based firewall can be useful for protecting 
against several Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks, isolating the server from specific net-
works in case of incidents and so on. The author is considering using utility Iptables. Ful-
filling this requirement covers also the requirement 136. The category for this requirement 
will be 2. 
To fulfil the requirement 183 “The systems local IPv4 firewall must implement a deny-all, 
allow-by-exception policy for inbound packets” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 
2015). There are several external and internal firewalls in place as described in the section 
when reviewing the requirement 97. In the author’s opinion, having additional local firewall 
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on each server gives more security, but “deny-all” rule might cause other problems and risks. 
For instance, if the author’s team accidently forgets to add valid firewall rule, it could trigger 
an incident with huge end user impact. In addition, this means that someone should manage 
and keep the firewall rules up to date. Meeting this requirement might be complicated, there-
fore discussion is needed. The category will be 3. 
Display unsuccessful login attempts: 
To meet the requirement 99, users must be informed about failed logins made with their 
accounts (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). This requirement is not in place, 
but can be easily added. 
Enable Postfix service: 
The requirement 100 states the Postfix service is required (Defense Information Systems 
Agency, 2015). The author disagrees with this requirement. The author’s team manages over 
thousand Linux servers, receiving hundreds of e-mails of system events doesn’t provide any 
value. In addition, installing Postfix on every server introduces a new attack vector. If nec-
essary – aggregated automated alerts can be created based on logs. This requirement is not 
relevant. 
Other services and requirements: 
To minimize the attack surface, then using Abrtd, Avahi and Bluetooth service is not al-
lowed to fulfil the requirements 76-78 (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). In 
contrast to Avahi, Cron service is required (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). 
This is needed for fulfilling the requirement 79. The requirements 77-79 are already imple-
mented, therefore the category will be 1. The requirement 76 is not relevant, because Abrtd 
service is running only on Red Hat systems. The requirements 86-88 are also about disabling 
unnecessary services like Netconsole, Ntpdate and Oddjobd (Defense Information Systems 
Agency, 2015). The requirement 86 and 88 is in place, but the author was not sure about the 
requirement 87, therefore a quick scan has been conducted on all servers. It came out that 
Ntpdate is installed on some servers. Service Ntpdate should be replaced with Ntpd service. 
The category for the requirement 87 will be 2. 
Next, the author points out all requirements which are in place. These requirements are 101-
102, 104-111, 120-121, 124-125, 149, 158, 184-185, 192-193, 181-182, 187, 189-191 and 
204, therefore the category for these will be 1. The details of these requirements are in Ap-
pendix 1. 
RDS, SCTP, TIPC protocol: 
The requirement 103 states “the Reliable Datagram Sockets (RDS) protocol must not be 
used unless it is needed” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). This rare network 
protocol is not automatically loaded to the kernel, but the attacker could change the kernel 
module configuration and reboot the system (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). 
Therefore, the author thinks that disabling RDS kernel module should be done in the kernel 
module configuration file as well for extra security and for easier auditing. Same should be 
done with the requirement 120 for disabling the Transparent Inter-Process Communication 
(SCTP) protocol (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) and requirement 188 for 
disabling the Transparent Inter-Process (TIPC) protocol (Defense Information Systems 
Agency, 2015). The category for these will be 2. 
SSH service: 
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The requirements 112-117 are about hardening SSH (Secure Shell) service. “The SSH dae-
mon must ignore .rhosts files” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) to fulfil the 
requirement 112. “SSH trust relationships mean a compromise on one host can allow an 
attacker to move trivially to other hosts” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). This 
requirement is in place on most servers, but some legacy servers do not have this require-
ment implemented. In addition, to meet the requirement 113 logon through SSH without 
password must be not allowed (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). Even though 
the author’s team is not using passwords for logging in via SSH, this requirement should be 
implemented for additional layer of security. The requirements 114 and 115 are not in place. 
The requirements 116 and 117 are about hardening SSH sessions idle timeout that are not 
in place (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). The author proposes that idle 
timeout should be 15 minutes. The category for all SSH requirements will be 2. 
System boot loader configuration: 
According to the requirement 122, “the system boot loader configuration files must have 
mode 0600 or less” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). In addition, the require-
ment 123 states that “the system boot loader must require authentication” (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015). These requirements are not in place. The author de-
cided that the requirement 123 is not relevant, because password protecting bootloader con-
figuration complicates management of thousands of servers. The category for the require-
ment 122 will be 2. 
Correct umask: 
The requirements 126-130 are about setting the correct system default umask (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015). Unauthorized users could read or even write in to files 
if umask is misconfigured (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). “The system de-
fault umask for daemons must be 027 or 022” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) 
to fulfil the requirement 126. Fulfilling this requirement is not straightforward, because un-
der /etc/init.d/ there are several daemons which doesn’t have the correct umask setting. To 
mitigate this, Linux Debian daemons configuration file /etc/rcS can be modified accord-
ingly, but as the author is not managing it with configuration management tools it might 
require some planning. Also, setting the umask to too restrictive can cause issues (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015). The category for this will requirement will be 3. The 
requirement 127 and 128 is about hardening Bash and Csh shell (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015). Shell Csh is disabled on the servers the author is managing, there-
fore the requirement 128 is not relevant. The requirement 127 is not in place and the category 
for this will be 2. To fulfil the requirement 129 and 130, umask in /etc/login.defs and 
/etc/profile must be set to 077 (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). The require-
ment 130 is not relevant, because in Linux Debian OS, PAM's (Linux Pluggable Authenti-
cation Modules) pam_umask.so module controls reading the umask setting from 
/etc/login.defs. The requirement 129 is not in place, because by default the umask value in 
/etc/login.defs is 022 in Linux Debian OS. The category for this requirement will be 2. 
Screen service: 
The requirement 131 states “the system must allow locking of the console screen in text 
mode” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) and that utility Screen must be in-
stalled (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). The author doesn’t see any benefit of 
this requirement. The author and his team is not using Screen utility and installing additional 
package might create additional attack vector, therefore this requirement is not relevant. 
Kernel parameters: 
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The requirements 132, 137-139, 141-146, 150-152, 173-174 are about hardening kernel pa-
rameters (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). The author scanned all their servers 
and discovered that none of these requirements are implemented, therefore the category for 
these requirements will be 2. The details of these requirement can be found in Appendix 1. 
The requirement 85 states that “The IPv6 protocol handler must not be bound to the network 
stack unless needed” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). This requirement is in 
place. The category for this requirement will be 1. 
Simultaneous system logins: 
“System must limit users to 10 simultaneous system logins, or a site-defined number, in 
accordance with operational requirements as limiting simultaneous user logins can insulate 
the system from denial of service problems caused by excessive logins” (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015) states the requirement 140. This requirement is not in 
place and the category will be 2. 
Interactive boot: 
“The system must not permit interactive boot” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 
2015) to fulfil the requirement 148. This requirement is not relevant. 
Virtual and serial consoles: 
The requirement 153 and 154 is about not allowing root user for accessing the system from 
virtual and serial consoles (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). Accessing the 
servers through console using root account might be needed in disaster recovery cases. The 
category for these requirements will be 3 – it needs further discussion. 
Communication over VPN: 
To meet the requirement 155, VPN (Virtual Private Network) must be used (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015). This requirement is not relevant, because none of the 
author’s team servers are placed in untrusted networks. Accessing these servers remotely is 
already done through VPN. 
Linux security module: 
The requirements 170-172 are about configuring Linux Security Module such as SELinux. 
As the author’s team is not using SELinux or Grsec, then these requirements are not rele-
vant. 
Filesystem: 
The requirements 175-179 state that the operating system must use an independent file sys-
tem for /var, /var/log, /tmp, /home and /var/log/audit to make sure that auditing continues 
working after specific partition is running out of space (Defense Information Systems 
Agency, 2015). These requirements are not in place. The category will be 3, because ful-
filling these requirements need reviewing the logic how virtual machine creation and provi-
sioning is done. 
Samba client and TFTP protocol: 
The requirement 180 which states “the system must use SMB (Samba) client signing for 
connecting to Samba servers using Smbclient” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 
2015) is not relevant, because the author’s team is not using Samba on any servers. Simi-
larly, the requirement 194 “There must be no .rhosts or hosts.equiv files on the system” 
(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) is not relevant, because the author’s team is 
already disabling rhosts in SSHD service configuration as stated in the requirement 112. In 
23 
 
addition, the requirement 186 is not relevant as the author’s team is not using TFTP (Trivial 
File Transfer Protocol) (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). 
3.3 Results 
The goal of the section 3.2 was to identify relevant requirements of the holding company 
hardening standard and analyse how complicated it is for the parent company to meet these 
requirements on Debian Linux operating system. According to analysis, it came out that 37 
(21%) requirements of 177 are not relevant, 56 (32%) requirements are in place, 73 (41%) 
requirements are not in place, but can be added easily. For the rest 11 (6%) requirements the 
solution is not straightforward and needs discussion with other teams. Figure 2 visualizes 
the results of the holding company hardening standard analysis.  
 
Figure 2. Results of the holding company hardening standard analysis 
Based on the results, it was decided that the parent company needs separate Linux hardening 
standard for Debian Linux operating system, mainly because the holding company harden-
ing standard which is based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense Information Systems 
Agency, 2015) has too many not relevant requirements for Debian systems. The holding 
company hardening standard will be taken as a baseline when establishing the new standard. 
3.4 Threats to Validity 
The main threat to validity is that the holding company hardening standard analysis result 
is mostly based on work experience of the author. The result could be different if the holding 
company standard was analysed by different person in the parent company. 
3.5 Establishing the Hardening Standard for the Parent Company 
In the section 3.2 there are 11 requirements which implementation is not straightforward, 
therefore discussion was done with other stakeholders and teams as well. The outcome of 
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24 
 
the meeting was that, the requirements 153-154 and 183 will not be part of the new harden-
ing standard. The requirements 10, 28, 126 and 175-179 will be added to the new hardening 
standard as well.  
New operating system (Debian Linux) hardening standard for the parent company will be 
established based on the section 3.2 relevant requirements. The goal is to protect the parent 
company from cyber threats and to meet the base security compliance requirements from 
the holding company. 
Based on the analysis in section 3.2, the author will categorize the relevant hardening re-
quirements to 9 groups. The hardening requirement numbers in the brackets refer to the 
actual requirement in the holding company Linux hardening standard (Appendix 1) which 
is based on DISA STIG for Red Hat Linux (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). 
1. Secure file and directory permissions and ownership 
The hardening requirements below are based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015): 
• Public directories owned by a system account (req. 4) 
• All Syslog-ng generated log files owned by root (req. 5) 
• System command files owned by root, have mode 0755 or less permissive (req. 
6,7) 
• Audit log files owned by root, have mode 0640 or less permissive (req. 8,9) 
• Shared libraries owned by root (req. 23) 
• Stricter mode for password, shadow and group files - owned by root, mode 0640 
or less (req. 37-49) 
• Sticky bits for public writable directories (req. 118) 
• Bootloader configuration files owned by root, mode 0600 (req. 120-122) 
• Secure umask is set by default for users and daemons (req. 126-127,129) 
2. Security related to auditing 
The hardening requirements below are based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015): 
• Auditing must be enabled at boot (req. 10) 
• Alert when the audit storage volume approaches capacity (req. 51, 75) 
• Audit attempts to change system time (req. 52-56) 
• Audit chmod (and fchmod, fchmodat) and chown (also fchown, fchownat, 
lchown) events (req. 57-62, 65) 
• Audit syscalls to set/change/remove extended attributes (*exattr) (req. 63-64, 
66-69) 
• Audit changes to sensitive config files: sudoers, password, shadow (req. 70, 90-
93) 
• Audit file system mounts (req. 72) 
• Audit loading and unloading of kernel modules (req. 73) 
• Audit user deletions of files and programs (req. 74) 
• Audit logs are forwarded remotely and rotated (req. 94, 98, 164-166) 
3. Secure SSHD configuration 
The hardening requirements below are based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015): 
• Display login banner (req. 2, 111) 
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• Only protocol version 2 is allowed (req. 110) 
• Ignore .rhosts files (req. 112) 
• Do not not allow host-based authentication and authentication using an empty 
password (req. 113-114) 
• Do not permit user environment settings (req. 115) 
• Idle timeout is enforced, set for 15 minutes (req. 116-117) 
• Root login is disabled (req. 149) 
• Password based authentication is disabled (only SSH key authentication al-
lowed) 
4. Secure kernel (Sysctls) configuration 
The hardening requirements below are based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015): 
• IP forwarding is disabled (req. 22) 
• Enable TCP syncookies (req. 132) 
• Ignore ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) redirects and bogus error re-
sponses, don’t send ICMP redirects (req. 137-139, 142-144, 151-152) 
• Source routed packets are not accepted (req. 145-146) 
• ICMP broadcasts are ignored (req. 150) 
• Reverse path filter is enabled (req. 173-174) 
• Martian packets are logged (req. 141) 
5. Security related to packages 
The hardening requirements below are based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015): 
• Samhain must be installed (req. 1) 
• Slapd, Rsh-server, Sendmail, Telnetd, Tftpd-hpa, Xinetd, Openbsd-inetd, 
Xserver-xorg, Nis packages must not be installed (req. 89, 108-109, 185, 187, 
190-191, 193) 
6. Security related to services 
The hardening requirements below are based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015): 
• Autofs, Atd, Avahi-daemon, Bluetooth, Netconsole, Ntpdate, Oddjobd, Qpidd, 
Rdisc, Rexecd, Rlogind, Rshd, Telnet, Xinetd, Ypbind, Openbsd-inetd, Nis ser-
vices must be disabled (req. 11, 50, 76-78, 86-88, 101-102, 104-105, 107, 184, 
189, 192) 
• Cron service must be running (req. 79) 
7. Security related to protocols 
The hardening requirements below are based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015): 
• Disable DCCP, RDS, SCTP, TIPC protocols (req. 80, 103, 119, 188) 
• Disable IPv6 protocol handler (req. 85) 
• Disable netconsole kernel module (req. 86) 
8. Secure partitioning layout 
The hardening requirements below are based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015): 
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• Independent filesystem for /tmp, /var, /var/log (req. 175-177) 
• Independent filesystem for the Auditd log files and user home directories (req. 
178-179) 
9. Other requirements that minimize the attack surface 
The hardening requirements below are based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 2015): 
• Disable process core dumps (req. 28) 
• Disable usb-storage kernel module (req. 95) 
• Install Iptables (req. 97, 136) 
• Show unsuccessful login attempts (req. 99) 
• Only root account has UID 0 (req. 106). Disable Root interactive login 
• Time is synchronized using Ntpd. Only internal NTP (Network Time Protocol) 
servers must be used (req. 124-125) 
• Simultaneous system logins limit enforced per user (req. 140) 
• All the installed packages are authenticated during installation. Installing un-
signed packages are not allowed (req. 181-182) 
• Disable X Windows (req. 204) 
Linux Debian OS hardened virtual machine image for Microsoft Azure platform will be 
built to make sure that these requirements are implemented. How this is done, will be de-
scribed in the next Chapter 4. To ensure the continuous compliance, there will be a solution 
which allows the parent company to validate the gap between the new standard and actual 
hardening configurations on servers. This will be described in the Chapter 5. 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we have analysed whether the holding company hardening standard based 
on DISA STIG for Red Hat is suitable for the parent company. As per our analysis, it was 
decided that the parent company needs separate Linux hardening standard for Debian Linux 
operating system. We have identified all relevant requirements for the parent company 
Debian Linux systems while analysing the holding company hardening standard. This al-
lowed us to establish the new hardening standard for the parent company which will be used 
as the baseline in the next chapters.  
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4 Implement the Operating System Hardening Standard 
In this chapter, we are analysing virtual machine image creation tools and choosing suitable 
tool for the parent company. We are integrating chosen tool with Microsoft Azure platform 
and configuration management tool Chef to automatically prepare a hardened virtual ma-
chine image for proof-of-concept. The hardened image will be prepared based on the new 
hardening standard which we have established in the section 3.5. As we can’t implement all 
the requirements from the new standard, then in this chapter we are choosing the most crit-
ical one’s for our proof-of-concept solution. We are also reviewing the related work in this 
field and describing briefly the benefits of hardened virtual machine image. 
In this chapter, we will answer to RQ3 which is: “How to implement Linux operating system 
hardening standard for security compliance?” To find answer to this question, we will an-
swer to several sub-questions: “What requirements of the OS hardening standard can be 
implemented on the parent company Debian Linux operating systems? What virtual ma-
chine image creation tool is suitable for the parent company for preparing the hardened base 
image? What it takes to integrate Microsoft Azure platform, Chef configuration manage-
ment and chosen image creation tool for automatically implementing the hardening stand-
ard?” 
4.1 Approach 
To achieve the second goal and answer to the RQ3 that we have stated in the section 1.2, we 
are first describing the purpose and benefits of the hardened virtual machine image in the 
section 4.2. To not reinvent the wheel for implementing the proof-of-concept solution, we 
are reviewing related work in this field and analysing existing open source tools out there 
(in the section 4.3) that can be used for hardened VM image creation in Microsoft Azure 
platform. These tools are Azure CLI, Azure Manage and Packer. The author tested these 
tools on Linux Debian workstation and compared whether they meet the requirements of 
the parent company. The result of image creation tools analysis is prerequisite for building 
the hardened VM image. After we have chosen hardening requirements for implementing, 
we will set up development environment which allows to follow TDD methodology. As 
Test-Driven Development methodology (Erdogmus, Morisio, & Torchiano, 2005) requires 
that tests should be prepared first before developing the solution, thus we have prepared the 
tests based on the hardening requirements which we have chosen in the section 4.4. We have 
developed these tests in InSpec testing framework – the tool that we are using for automated 
security compliance auditing in the Chapter 5. These tests are described in the section 5.5 
and in Appendix 3. For developing the solution, the Chef cookbook project has been created 
(Appendix 2). This cookbook contains all necessary code for automatically implementing 
the new hardening standard requirements based on the section 4.4. Finally, we have inte-
grated Chef cookbook with chosen VM image creation tool and with Microsoft Azure plat-
form. As a result, we will build the new hardened VM image which is based on the new 
hardening standard that we have established in this thesis. 
4.2 Benefits of Hardened Image 
According to Azure documentation created by Nottingham, Peterson, Foulds, & Squillace 
(2016), images in Microsoft Azure are required to provision a new virtual machine with pre-
installed operating system and installed software. Based on the author’s experience, the 
standard Microsoft Azure Linux images are not built for security by default nor they are 
hardened against any security guidelines. Overall, they are made to cater the largest cus-
tomer base, therefore the author will create their own hardened custom base image for Linux 
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Debian OS based on the new hardening standard for the parent company as described in the 
section 3.5. 
Creating a custom hardened image is needed for the parent company for several other rea-
sons. Firstly, when using only configuration management tools (Puppet, Chef, Ansible etc.) 
for bootstrapping new virtual machines directly then there are possibilities that first boot-
strap will fail (temporary network issues, packages repository might be unavailable etc.), 
this leaves new instance as “half secure” and non-compliant because some security features 
have not been implemented. Secondly, the author’s team provides infrastructure for several 
development teams. Developers might not always take security into account during the build 
process, therefore having the hardened image gives confidence to the developers that the 
OS where their code is running is compliant. Thirdly, provisioning a new virtual machine 
will be much faster if all needed features are already implemented in the custom image. To 
reduce these risks, pre-hardened custom base image is needed. This increases the parent 
company confidence that all their Linux virtual machines are compliant - have identical 
security hardening configurations implemented. This is step forward for passing the holding 
company internal audit.  
4.3 Compare Image Creation Tools 
There are several possibilities for creating custom Microsoft Azure images. In this master’s 
thesis, the author is analysing tools named Azure CLI, Azure Manage and Packer. In this 
section, the goal is to choose suitable image creation tooling for the parent company. The 
author expects that these tools meet the following requirements: 
1. Is open source and works on Linux operating system; 
2. Azure ARM (Azure Resource Manager) deployment model is supported; 
3. Supports configuration management tool Chef to install software onto the image; 
4. Automatically uploads image to Azure Blob storage account; 
5. Possible to create Debian Wheezy and Debian Jessie images; 
6. Easy to install and good documentation; 
Azure Command-Line Interface 
According to Kshirsagar, et al. (2017), Azure Command-Line Interface (Azure CLI) is a 
Windows and Linux tool that provides shell commands for managing resources in Microsoft 
Azure platform. As described in Microsoft Azure documentation created by Kshirsagar, et 
al. (2017), installing Azure CLI is not complicated – using Npm package, Windows installer 
or Docker container. The author is using Npm package installed on Debian Linux. Accord-
ing to Foulds, et al. (2017), with Azure CLI, it is possible to create a new Linux virtual 
machines, generalize and capture the whole virtual machine and prepare it to be used as an 
image while using azure vm generalize and azure vm capture shell commands. As a result, 
new virtual machines can be created using the custom image. There is a good documentation 
available how to do it step-by-step (Foulds, et al., 2017). 
Although installing Azure CLI is easy, it works on Debian Linux, supports Azure ARM 
mode, supports Chef and it has a great documentation, then still many additional commands 
should be executed to create and upload the custom image to Azure storage account. In 
author’s opinion, this takes too much time and requires extra resources for building the com-
plete solution which meets the parent company requirements. 
Azure Manage 
According to Blank (2017), Azure Manage is a set of scripts for managing Debian images 
within the Microsoft Azure platform. There is a good documentation available how to install 
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the dependencies and the tool itself on Debian Jessie (Zarkos, et al., 2017), but in author’s 
opinion how to operate (which commands and parameters should be used) with this tool is 
poorly documented. This tool supports Azure ARM mode, Debian Wheezy and Jessie image 
creation, image uploading to Azure storage account (Blank, 2017), but separate tooling is 
needed for bootstrapping Chef cookbooks and recipes onto the specific image. Overall, it 
seems to be excellent tool for creating images from scratch, but it requires extra resources 
for building the solution which meets the parent company requirements. 
Packer 
According to HashiCorp (2017a), Packer is a tool that can be used for building custom vir-
tual machine images from a configuration file that is defined by a user. It is possible to 
integrate Packer with multiple configuration management tools such as Chef and integrate 
it with several cloud platforms such as Azure and AWS (HashiCorp, 2017a). According to 
HashiCorp (2017b,c) documentation, installing Packer on Linux is very easy, because it’s 
distributed as a binary package. It supports Azure ARM deployment model, Debian Wheezy 
and Jessie image creation, it automatically uploads ready images to Azure storage account 
and has an excellent documentation. 
Summarized overview of virtual machine image creation tools is listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Results of comparing virtual machine image creation tools 
Requirement Azure 
CLI 
Azure Manage Packer 
Open Source + + + 
Azure ARM support + + + 
Chef support + - + 
Automatic image upload to Azure storage ac-
count 
- - + 
Debian Wheezy and Jessie image creation 
support 
+ + + 
Easy to install + + + 
Good documentation + - + 
Results: 
Based on the short analysis, Azure CLI and Azure Manage is not suitable tool for the parent 
company as they don’t support automatic image upload to Azure storage account. Moreover, 
Azure Manage has bad documentation and it does not have any built-in Chef features for 
bootstrapping Chef cookbooks onto the specific image. Thus, Packer meets all these require-
ments, therefore it will be chosen as virtual machine image creation tool for the parent com-
pany. 
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4.4 Choosing Hardening Requirements for Implementing 
Before we can start with implementing the solution, we need to choose requirements from 
the new hardening standard what can be applied on our proof-of-concept hardened image. 
As we can’t implement all the requirements in this thesis due to limited resources, then we 
are choosing the most critical one’s and requirements that are technically easier to imple-
ment for our proof-of-concept solution.  
The following hardening requirement groups from the Chapter 3 section 3.5 will be imple-
mented: 
1. Group 1 - Secure file and directory permissions and ownership 
2. Group 3 - Secure SSHD configuration 
3. Group 4 - Secure kernel (Sysctls) configuration 
4. Group 5 - Security related to packages 
5. Group 6 - Security related to services 
6. Group 7 - Security related to protocols 
The exact hardening requirements from these groups are also listed in the section 3.5. As in 
this thesis we are implementing a proof-of-concept prototype in the testing environment, 
then we can safely implement any hardening requirement from the above groups. 
4.5 Preparing Development and Testing Environment 
In this section, we are preparing a new Chef cookbook project hardened-infra (Appendix 2) 
which is prerequisite for building the hardened image for the parent company. For Chef 
cookbook development, we will set up development environment using Test Kitchen and 
integrate it with Microsoft Azure platform, testing and compliance analysis tool InSpec and 
with Chef. Finally, we will prepare Packer template and build the new hardened image based 
on the new hardening standard requirements which we have implemented in Chef cookbook 
hardened-infra.   
Preparing Test Kitchen 
For following the TDD methodology during Chef cookbook development, then the author 
decided to use Test Kitchen tool. “Test Kitchen is an integration tool for developing and 
testing infrastructure code on isolated target platforms” (Nichol, 2017). This tool allows the 
author to create test machines, apply configuration management tool changes and test the 
changes afterwards. After finishing the development, the test machine can be easily de-
stroyed.  
In this thesis, we are using a plugin that is suitable for Test Kitchen and Azure ARM 
(Preston, 2017). We are also using a driver for integrating Test Kitchen with testing frame-
work InSpec (Hartmann, 2017). While using these drivers, we will create test virtual ma-
chines to Azure, bootstrap it with Chef cookbook after each new feature development and 
test the changes after. 
In a Chef cookbook project (Appendix 2), kitchen.yml configuration file should be defined 
accordingly (See Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Test Kitchen configuration file that was prepared with the help of documentation 
of Test Kitchen plugin for Azure (Preston, 2017) 
Test Kitchen configuration file in Figure 3 is used for creating a test virtual machine running 
on Linux Debian Wheezy with minimum Standard_A0 size (1 CPU, 0.768 GB RAM, 20GiB 
HDD) to Azure cloud platform. This test machine is bootstrapped with Chef cookbook 
named hardened-infra (Appendix 2). In this thesis, we are using this test machine for im-
plementing the hardening requirements from the section 4.4. 
Developing Chef Cookbook 
For preparing a new hardened Debian virtual machine image, the author has developed a 
new Chef cookbook named hardened-infra (Appendix 2). This cookbook contains all nec-
essary code for automatically implementing the new hardening standard requirements based 
on the section 4.4. Separate Chef cookbook is needed mostly for two reasons. Firstly, it is 
used to apply needed changes onto the virtual machine image in Azure with help of Packer 
tool (using chef-solo or chef-client provisioner). How this is done will be described in the 
next section. Secondly, the author’s team has servers outside of Azure platform (for various 
compliance reasons), where Azure images are not compatible. These servers are boot-
strapped with Chef directly. Basically, having a separate Chef cookbook gives us the confi-
dence that applied configuration is the same on all servers – on virtual machines in Azure 
and outside of Azure. 
Each OS hardening requirement group (listed in the section 4.4) has a separate Chef recipe 
(Ruby code snippet) in hardened-infra Chef cookbook. For example, the Chef recipe pack-
ages.rb removes and installs packages (See Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Chef recipe for removing and installing packages 
The Chef recipe services.rb stops and starts needed services according to the new hardening 
standard (See Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Chef recipe for stopping and starting services 
All the rest of the Chef recipes for implementing the hardening requirements based on the 
section 4.4 are available in Appendix 2. 
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Preparing Packer template 
In this section, the author is preparing a Packer template for building the hardened Linux 
Debian Wheezy virtual machine image for proof-of-concept solution. 
For preparing the hardened virtual machine image, the author installed Packer on Linux 
Debian workstation. After that, we have followed instructions from Packer documentation 
(HashiCorp, 2017d) to prepare configuration (template) that describes how to build custom 
VM images (HashiCorp, 2017d). According to HashiCorp (2017c,e), several configuration 
parameters should be defined before building VM image for Azure. The following config-
uration parameters are required for authenticating against Azure API as described in Figure 
6: subscription_id, client_id, client_secret, resource_group_name and storage_account 
(HashiCorp, 2017c,e). The author used a setup script (Bednarski, 2017) which automatically 
sets up specific Azure resources and exports necessary JSON configuration parameters and 
values for Packer. According to HashiCorp (2017e), the author had to set up capture_con-
tainer_name, capture_name_prefix, image_publisher, image_offer, image_sku, location, 
vm_size and os_type parameters and values for ARM builder as described in Figure 6 under 
"builders" section.   
 
Figure 6. Packer template – variables and builders section. Template has been prepared 
with the help of Packer documentations (HashiCorp, 2017c,d,e) 
Figure 7 describes shell and chef-solo provisioner sections. In Figure 7 the Packer shell 
provisioner (HashiCorp, 2017g) sets up prerequisites for Chef and upgrades all system pack-
ages to latest version. The chef-solo Packer provisioner (HashiCorp, 2017f) installs hard-
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ened-infra Chef cookbook which applies necessary hardening changes from section 4.4. Fi-
nally, the Packer shell provisioner (HashiCorp, 2017g) is used for executing waagent de-
provision command that does necessary changes to the system for reprovisioning 
(HashiCorp, 2017e).  
 
Figure 7. Packer template –  Chef and Shell provisioners. Template has been prepared 
with the help of Packer documentations (HashiCorp, 2017c,d,e,f,g) 
In the next section 4.6 we are building the hardened virtual machine image using the Packer 
template which we have prepared in this section. 
4.6 Building Hardened Virtual Machine Image 
Before building the hardened virtual machine image with Packer, the packer validate com-
mand should be used for verifying configuration and the syntax of a template (HashiCorp, 
2017d). For triggering the build, we are executing packer build command (HashiCorp, 
2017d). Packer build prepares an Azure template (JSON file) and a VHD (Virtual Hard 
Disk) image file (HashiCorp, 2017e). Figure 8 shows that the hardened Debian Wheezy 
image was built and uploaded to Azure storage account. 
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Figure  8. The hardened Debian Wheezy image built by Packer (view from Azure Portal) 
For testing the new custom hardened Linux Debian Wheezy image created by Packer, the 
author has created a new virtual machine based on the new image using Azure CLI utility. 
See the command below: 
azure vm create westeurope-martin-packer2 -l "westeurope" --resource-group pack-
erbuild1337 --image-urn https://packerbuild1337.blob.core.windows.net/system/Mi-
crosoft.Compute/Images/images/packer-osDisk.eb219e2f-646e-4f0f-89b3-
4e45674c61b5.vhd -u martinj -M ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub -y Linux --storage-account-name 
packerbuild1337 -f packernic1 
After logging in to this virtual machine, the author confirmed that necessary hardening 
changes have been implemented. In the next Chapter 5, we have implemented a solution 
that automatically verifies if the hardening changes are implemented to ensure that the par-
ent company is compliant with security compliance requirements of the holding company. 
4.7 Related Work in this Field 
Despite the importance of security compliance and OS hardening, the author has discovered 
that little research has been done in this field, especially when researching automation pos-
sibilities for implementing hundreds of security controls from specific OS hardening stand-
ard.  
Montesino & Fenz (2011a,b) have published an interesting research paper that analyses how 
many security controls can be automated based on ISO 27001 and NIST SP800-53 stand-
ards. It concentrates on automating technical and procedural security controls as well. The 
researchers have concluded that 30% of the security controls included in these standards can 
be automated by using existing tools (Montesino & Fenz, 2011a,b). The main differences 
between these papers and this thesis are that they are not implementing any automated 
solution. Instead, they are listing potential tools that can be used for automatically 
implementing security controls and they are analysing how many security controls can be 
automated. Moreover, they are taking different security standard as a baseline. 
According to Bird (2016), there are examples available for harden Linux systems using con-
figuration management tools like Puppet, Chef and Ansible. One of the example is Chef 
cookbook (Richter, 2017a) that is based on NSA Red Hat standard (National Security 
Agency, 2007). Similar Puppet module (Richter, 2017b) and Ansible playbook is available 
as well (Gumprich, 2017). After reviewing these solutions, we have decided that these are 
not suitable for the parent company, because these solutions have limited requirements im-
plemented and they are not fully based on DISA STIG for Red Hat. 
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In addition, we have investigated if there are pre-built hardened virtual images available for 
provisioning instances in the cloud. CIS is providing hardened virtual images for the Ama-
zon Web Services (AWS) cloud platform (Center For Internet Security, 2017b). These im-
ages are hardened according to CIS standards (Center for Internet Security, 2017a). This is 
not suitable for the author, because the author’s team is using Microsoft Azure cloud. Be-
sides that, CIS hardened image for AWS is not free and we are using different OS hardening 
standard as a baseline. 
4.8 Summary 
In this chapter, we have reviewed related work in this field. We discovered that not much 
academic research has been done in this field. For better understanding for the readers, we 
briefly described why hardened image is needed for the parent company. Before we could 
start with implementing the proof-of-concept solution, we have analysed three open source 
tools which can be used for image creation – Azure CLI, Azure Manage and Packer. As per 
our analysis, it was decided that Packer is the most suitable image creation tool as it met all 
the requirements of the parent company. We have chosen the most critical requirements 
from the new hardening standard which we have applied in the new hardened image for 
Linux Debian Wheezy. Before building the hardened image, we have prepared a Chef cook-
book which contains all the code for automatically implementing the hardening require-
ments. For that, we have prepared development and testing environment using Test Kitchen 
which allowed us to integrate Microsoft Azure platform and configuration management tool 
Chef during Chef cookbook development. Finally, we have prepared Packer template where 
we integrated Packer with Microsoft Azure platform and Chef configuration management 
tool. As a result, we have built the new hardened image which is based on the new hardening 
standard. 
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5 Auditing the New Hardening Standard 
In this chapter, we are reviewing related work in security compliance auditing field. We are 
reviewing several research papers and potential compliance tools for automated auditing. In 
addition, we are briefly describing the importance of automated compliance auditing for the 
parent company. Finally, we are choosing automated compliance auditing tool for the parent 
company and proof-of-concept solution will be implemented by developing security com-
pliance auditing tests which are based on the new hardening standard. 
In this chapter, we will answer to RQ4 which is: “How to audit Linux operating system 
hardening standard for security compliance?” To find answer to this question, we will an-
swer to several sub-questions: “What solutions are there that can be used for the automated 
security compliance auditing based on the company OS hardening standard? What tool is 
suitable for the parent company? What it takes to develop security compliance checks (tests) 
for the OS hardening requirements which we have implemented in this project?” 
5.1 Approach 
To achieve the third goal and answer to the RQ4 that we have stated in the section 1.2, we 
are first describing the purpose and the importance of the automated security compliance 
auditing in the section 5.2. To not reinvent the wheel for implementing the proof-of-concept 
auditing solution, we are reviewing related work in this field and analysing existing open 
source tools out there (in the section 5.3) that can be used for automated security compliance 
auditing. We have reviewed tools such as OpenScap, ServerSpec, InSpec, Rspec and audit 
mode in Chef Client. Due to limited resources and time, we had no possibility to test hands-
on experience of all tools. The suitable tool was mostly chosen based on the existing litera-
ture, related work, documentations, requirements of the parent company and work experi-
ence of the author. Automated security compliance auditing tool is chosen for the parent 
company and security compliance tests (controls) are developed for each OS hardening re-
quirement from the section 4.4 using the same development environment that we have set 
up in the section 4.5. As a result, the proof-of-concept solution is implemented for automat-
ically auditing the new hardening standard that we have established in this thesis. 
5.2 The Importance of Automated Auditing 
Even though the new hardening standard is now established and implemented, then there is 
still a gap how to prove to the auditors that the parent company meets the new hardening 
standard and is compliant from security perspective. It is not enough to just meet the holding 
company regulatory requirements, we need to ensure auditability of it. 
The parent company has over thousand Linux servers and there is no automated solution for 
security compliance auditing, therefore it requires many human resources to collect data for 
the auditors which is not cost effective for the company. Besides saving time and resources, 
automated and continuous security compliance auditing gives the confidence that all the 
servers are hardened as per standard – any misconfiguration will be detected and fixed be-
fore providing evidence to the auditor.  
Moreover, the parent company is doing hundreds of production changes every month. Au-
tomated security compliance auditing makes sure that these changes are also compliant with 
the new hardening standard.  
The parent company has several annual audits, where auditor comes on-site and requires 
real time evidence of specific OS configuration. Automated real time security compliance 
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auditing will save time for the all stakeholders – it is just matter of triggering the automation 
and auditors will get the compliance state results automatically. 
To solve this cap, the author will choose the suitable tool for automated security compliance 
auditing in the next section 5.3. 
5.3 Choosing the Tool for Automated Compliance Auditing 
The author expects that the new security compliance auditing tool meets the following re-
quirements of the parent company: 
1. It is open source and it can be easily installed; 
2. It requires no configuration overhead during set up; 
3. It supports Linux Debian OS; 
4. It supports automated security compliance auditing on local servers (running as an 
agent); 
5. It supports automated security compliance auditing on remote servers via SSH; 
6. It has human readable language, so that auditors and management can understand 
the security compliance auditing tests; 
7. It can be used as testing tool for integration testing; 
8. Test development should be straightforward; 
9. It has a good documentation; 
10. It should provide human readable report of the scanning results; 
11. It should provide report in JSON, XML or other format for automation purposes;  
12. It can be triggered any time during evidence providing for auditors; 
As the security compliance auditing tool must be open source, then we are not reviewing 
tools such as QualysGuard, Nessus, Nexpose, Chef Compliance and other enterprise tools. 
Although we have discovered in the section 5.6 that several researches have been done using 
SCAP based tools, then the author decided that SCAP based solutions do not meet the re-
quirements of the parent company. Especially it does not meet the requirement 6 and 8 as 
the XCCDF is not user friendly to read and to develop in the author’s opinion.  
During our project, we have analysed several open source tools that can be used for auto-
mated security compliance auditing such as SCAP based solution OpenScap that we discov-
ered while reviewing related work in the section 5.6. We have also analysed testing frame-
works and tools such as ServerSpec, InSpec and Rspec. In addition, we have tried audit 
mode feature in Chef Client. After comparing these with each other, we have chosen InSpec 
testing framework as suitable tool for the parent company. The reason behind choosing this 
tool is that it met all the requirements of the parent company. Especially that its language is 
easy to read and develop, it’s built for automated security compliance auditing and contin-
uous testing and allows to write security compliance requirements in to code (Chef Software 
Inc, 2017a). As InSpec is the tool we are using for security compliance auditing, then we 
are briefly describing it in the next section 5.4. 
5.4 Compliance as Code and InSpec 
In this section, we are describing the meaning of „Compliance as Code“ and presenting the 
open source “Compliance as Code” testing framework and security compliance auditing 
tool InSpec. 
Bird (2016) states that "DevOps can be followed to achieve what Justin Arbuckle at Chef 
calls “Compliance as Code”: building compliance into development and operations, and 
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wiring compliance policies and checks and auditing into Continuous Delivery so that regu-
latory compliance becomes an integral part of how DevOps teams work on a day-today 
basis." (p. 69). There is an interesting interview article where the term "compliance as code" 
is explained by Justin Arbuckle (Arbuckle, 2014). According to Arbuckle (2014), it is ad-
vised to address security compliance requirements from the beginning of new product de-
velopment. We agree with this statement, therefore we are following this DevOps approach 
in this thesis and using the tool InSpec for converting OS hardening requirements into code. 
We have used this approach while developing Chef cookbook for implementing the OS 
hardening requirements (the section 4.5) by writing tests first for any OS hardening require-
ment. These tests will be also used for continuous security compliance auditing. We have 
developed these tests in the next section 5.5. 
"InSpec is an open-source testing framework for infrastructure with a human-readable lan-
guage for specifying compliance, security and other policy requirements" (Chef Software 
Inc, 2017a). During our research, we discovered that it meets all the requirements of the 
parent company that we have listed in the section 5.3. Besides that, InSpec has multiple 
built-in resources that simplifies tests creation and it is possible to add additional infor-
mation to any security compliance auditing test, so that everyone can understand the re-
quirements (auditors, management etc.) " (Chef Software Inc, 2017a). For better understand-
ing, the author has created InSpec profile named inspec-hardened-infra. The author de-
scribes the default example test (also called as control) that is created automatically by de-
fault after any InSpec profile creation. This example (example.rb) is presented in Figure 9. 
 
Figure  9. Example of InSpec test and its language (Chef Software Inc, 2017b) 
Line 1 is a unique ID for the control. Line 2 defines the criticality if the control fails. Line 3 
and 4 is a human readable title and description of the control. Line 5-7 is the actual test 
block. InSpec built-in resource named file is used in line 5. File location is set to /tmp direc-
tory. Line 6 contains the test which expects that the file in location /tmp is a directory (Chef 
Software Inc, 2017b). In Figure 10, successful test result is presented after executing InSpec 
profile inspec-hardened-infra on Linux workstation. 
 
Figure  10. Results after executing example InSpec profile 
InSpec has other useful features which we are not describing in this thesis. Based on our 
hands-on experience, we can say that InSpec is a very simple testing framework which can 
be used for security compliance auditing. In the next section 5.5, we are developing InSpec 
tests for each OS hardening requirement from the section 4.4.    
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5.5 Developing Security Compliance Auditing Tests 
We have developed InSpec tests for each OS hardening requirement from the section 4.4. 
For example, Figure 11 describes security compliance auditing tests for verifying if the new 
OS hardening standard requirements from the group 5 (Security related to packages) are 
met. 
 
Figure  11. InSpec tests – 5. Security related to packages 
Figure 12 presents the tests for verifying if SSHD configuration is hardened according to 
the new standard. All the rest of the tests are available in Appendix 3. 
 
Figure  12. InSpec tests – 3. Secure SSHD configuration 
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These tests allowed the author to follow TDD methodology as well while implementing the 
OS hardening standard in the Chapter 4. Moreover, we are using these tests for automatically 
and continuously auditing the new OS hardening standard of the parent company. For de-
veloping security compliance auditing tests, the author used the same development and test-
ing environment using Test Kitchen as described in the section 4.5. While developing secu-
rity compliance auditing tests, we have used DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015) auditing guidelines where possible, such as Linux commands what 
to execute for verifying if specific security requirement has been implemented. 
To validate the gap between the new OS hardening standard and actual hardening configu-
ration on servers on regular basis, we have reused the InSpec profile inspec-hardened-infra 
that we created in the section 5.4. After we have finished the development and testing using 
Test Kitchen, we added InSpec tests into InSpec profile inspec-hardened-infra. Later, we 
discovered that it is not needed as Test Kitchen can be integrated with remote InSpec pro-
files, so that it is not needed to keep the same tests in two separate places. This profile is 
used to execute InSpec controls (tests) on any remote server via SSH. After execution, re-
sults are provided automatically whether the server is compliant according the new OS hard-
ening standard. We will analyse the results in the next Chapter 6. 
5.6 Related Work in this Field 
The author has discovered that there are several researches done in security compliance 
auditing field, especially in cloud computing area. For example, there is a research done 
about building automated security compliance tool using CloudAudit frameworks and 
OpenVAS vulnerability scanning tool on OpenStack cloud platform (Ullah, Ahmed, & 
Ylitalo, 2013). Doelitzscher (2014) and Bleikertz (2010) came up with a solution for audit-
ing cloud platforms. The main difference between these papers and this thesis is that they 
concentrate on auditing the cloud platform, not the virtual machines running on the cloud 
platform with relevant standards as we do in this thesis. 
Koschorreck (2011) did a research about the OVAL (Open Vulnerability and Assessment 
Language) and XCCDF languages and how they can be used for SCAP-based solution for 
automated security compliance auditing. Koschorreck (2011) used a tool UPW Compliance 
Guard for implementing security compliance auditing tests for specific security controls.  
Montesino (2011b) and Fenz (2011b) also concluded that SCAP can be used for automating 
security compliance auditing (Montesino & Fenz, 2011b). These research papers are useful 
sources, because the holding company hardening standard is based on DISA STIG for Red 
Hat (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) which is published as XCCDF as well. 
Therefore, the author considered using SCAP-based solution as a potential security 
compliance auditing tool and reuse the XCCDF XML file published by DISA. There are 
several SCAP based products available validated by NIST (The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2017c). However, after analysing security compliance analysing 
tools in the section 5.3, the author decided that SCAP-based tools do not meet the parent 
company requirements, therefore we are not using SCAP-based tool for automated security 
compliance auditing in this thesis. Instead, we decided that testing framework and security 
compliance auditing tool InSpec is suitable for the parent company.  
5.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we have reviewed related work in this field. We have discovered that there 
are several research papers available related to automated security compliance auditing. We 
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have briefly described why automated security auditing is important and needed for the par-
ent company. We have reviewed several open source tools that can be used for automated 
security compliance auditing such as SCAP-based tool OpenScap, that we discovered while 
reviewing related work in this field, testing frameworks ServerSpec, InSpec, Rspec and au-
dit mode in Chef Client. InSpec “Compliance as Code” testing framework was chosen as it 
met all the requirements of the parent company. Moreover, we have briefly described the 
meaning of DevOps approach “Compliance as Code” which we have followed while imple-
menting the proof-of-concept solution. In addition, InSpec testing framework and its use 
cases have been described. Finally, we have developed security compliance auditing tests 
using InSpec for automatically auditing the new OS hardening standard. 
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6 Validation of Proof of Concept Solution 
In this chapter, we are validating the proof-of-concept solution that we have implemented 
in this thesis. The author is describing the methodology and environment that is used for 
validating. Finally, we will analyse and write summary of the findings. 
In this chapter, we will answer to RQ5 for achieving the fourth goal in the section 1.2. The 
RQ5 is: “How many OS hardening requirements each chosen virtual machine (VM) meets 
from the new OS hardening standard?” For validating the proof-of-concept solution, we will 
find answer to how many OS hardening requirements are met on a virtual machine that was 
created with hardened and non-hardened VM image. 
6.1 Methodology and Validation Question 
For validating the proof-of-concept solution – Linux Debian VM (virtual machine) image 
that is hardened according to the new OS hardening standard, the author will choose two 
virtual machines from the parent company server park in Azure. One server is created with 
default (non-hardened) VM image and the second one is created with hardened VM image 
that was built in the section 4.6. For validation, the author decided to measure how many OS 
hardening requirements each chosen VM meets from the new OS hardening standard? Se-
curity compliance tool InSpec and its profile inspec-hardened-infra that we have developed 
in the section 5.5 is used for comparing and analysing the results automatically. This allows 
the author to validate the functionality of chosen automated security compliance auditing 
tool as well. Figure 13 visualizes the proof-of-concept solution validation steps. 
 
Figure  13. Proof-of-concept solution validation steps 
The environment for validating is simple – the author installed InSpec on his Linux work-
station. InSpec profile (Appendix 3) is used to execute InSpec auditing controls (tests) on 
chosen remote servers via SSH in Azure. There is InSpec control for each OS hardening 
requirement group that we have listed the section 4.4. In this case, it means that 138 tests 
are executed on each VM. We are analysing the results of InSpec scan results in the next 
section 6.2. 
6.2 Results 
The automated security compliance auditing tool InSpec detailed scan results are available 
in Appendix 4. We have validated if hardening requirements in the section 4.4 are imple-
mented and in place on each VM. Figure 14 presents the InSpec scan results based on a VM 
that was created with default (non-hardened) VM image. Figure 15 presents the InSpec scan 
results based on a VM that was created with hardened VM image that we have built in this 
thesis. 
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Figure  14. InSpec scan results based on non-hardened virtual machine 
It came out that 29 tests of 138 (~21%) did not pass and 109 tests (~79 %) did pass on non-
hardened VM. This means that this VM is not compliant with 29 OS hardening requirements 
from the new OS hardening standard. To be more detailed, 8 requirements from the group 
„Group 1 - Secure file and directory permissions and ownership” are not in place, such as 
correct file and owner permissions on /etc/group, /etc/gshadow, /etc/passwd files and correct 
umask value in login.defs configuration file. The SSHD configuration file (Group 3 - Secure 
SSHD configuration) is not compliant with 6 OS hardening requirements. Configuration 
values such as PermitUserEnvironment, ClientAliveCountMax, ClientAliveInterval, Per-
mitRootLogin are not compliant with the new OS hardening standard. In addition, SSH login 
banner is missing. Linux Kernel configuration (Group 4 - Secure kernel Sysctls configura-
tion) is not compliant with 14 requirements such as net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians, 
net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6, net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 and other parameters that 
are listed in Appendix 4. There are no packages installed that are not compliant (Group 6 - 
Security related to services), although file integrity monitoring tool Samhain is not installed, 
therefore 1 requirement in this group is not compliant with the new standard. The OS hard-
ening requirements from the other groups (Group 6 - Security related to services and Group 
7 - Security related to protocols) are all met.  
 
Figure  15. InSpec scan results based on hardened virtual machine 
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We can see that VM created with the new hardened image meets all the hardening require-
ments that we have taken in to scope. All OS hardening requirements from the chosen con-
trol groups (138 InSpec tests in total) are applied on hardened VM. 
6.3 Discussion 
Based on the results from the previous section, it is visible that our proof-of-concept solution 
improved the security compliance percentage of the parent company by ~21 % (based on 
example of one virtual machine). We discovered that virtual machine that was created with 
a default VM image did not comply with 29 hardening requirements from the new OS hard-
ening standard. In contrast to VM with default VM image, VM with hardened image is 
compliant with all the requirements from the new OS hardening standard. We have validated 
the proof-of-concept solution that improves the situation for being compliant with the hold-
ing company security compliance requirements. In addition, we have also confirmed that 
standard Microsoft Azure Linux Debian images are not built for security by default nor they 
are hardened against any security guidelines. 
6.4 Threats to Validity 
One of the main threats to validity is the count of virtual machines that we are validating. 
Due to limited resources and time, we will not measure the results of the whole server park 
of the parent company, instead we are taking into scope two virtual machines – one created 
with a new hardened VM image and the second one created with the default (non-hardened) 
VM image. The results could be different while auditing the whole server park.  
The second threat is that we are taking only the hardening requirements in to scope that were 
chosen in the section 4.4. Therefore, the parent company might not be compliant with other 
hardening requirements from the new standard.  
Third threat is that we have implemented proof-of-concept solution in this thesis which 
means that this solution has not been actively tested, therefore some issues could pop up 
that we are not aware of and affect the automated security compliance auditing results (dur-
ing implementation we haven’t noticed any).  
Last but not least threat to validity is a cloud vendor. As the virtual machines are hosted in 
Azure cloud, then the parent company has no control over Azure cloud availability and re-
liability. Incidents caused by cloud vendor, could also affect the validation results. 
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have validated our proof-of-concept solution - a hardened Linux Debian 
VM image and security compliance auditing tool InSpec. For that, we have created two 
virtual machines – one with default (non-hardened) VM image and one with hardened VM 
image that we have built in the Chapter 4. We have described the methodology for validation 
and answered to the validation question: how many OS hardening requirements each chosen 
VM meets from the new OS hardening standard? According to InSpec scan results, we dis-
covered that 29 hardening requirements (~21%) of 138 are not met on VM that was created 
with non-hardened image. Virtual machine that was created with hardened image meets all 
the OS hardening requirements and passes all 138 security compliance auditing tests. 
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7 Conclusions and Future Work 
In this thesis, we have implemented a proof-of-concept solution for building a hardened 
Debian Linux virtual machine image for Azure cloud that is compliant with the holding 
company security compliance requirements. To support the work in thesis, we have done 
background study for understanding the importance of security compliance and operating 
system hardening, we have studied several security standards and hardening guidelines such 
as PCI DSS, HIPAA, ISO (27000 series), NIST (SP800 series) and hardening guidelines 
provided by CIS, NSA, NIST and DISA. Before we could start implementing the solution, 
we have analysed the holding company Linux hardening standard that is based on DISA 
STIG for Red Hat (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). As the holding company 
hardening standard is based on DISA STIG for Red Hat, but the virtual machines that the 
parent company is managing are running on Linux Debian operating system, therefore the 
author decided to analyse the holding company standard and identify the relevant OS hard-
ening requirements for Debian Linux systems. Based on the results, the holding company 
standard has too many not relevant hardening requirements for Debian systems, therefore 
new standard has been established for the parent company that is based on DISA STIG for 
Red Hat. This new standard is used as a baseline for implementing the proof-of-concept 
solution in this thesis. 
In this paper, we have analysed three open source tools which can be used for hardened 
virtual machine image creation in Microsoft Azure cloud platform – Azure CLI, Azure Man-
age and Packer. As per our analysis, it was decided that Packer is the most suitable image 
creation tool as it met all the requirements of the parent company. Before building the hard-
ened image, we have prepared a Chef configuration management tool cookbook which con-
tains all the code for automatically implementing the hardening requirements from the new 
standard. Later, we integrated it with Packer and with Microsoft Azure platform and new 
hardened image has been built. Finally, we have compared our work with related work in 
security compliance implementing field. 
Even though the new hardening standard was established and implemented, then there was 
still a gap how to prove to the auditors that the parent company meets the new hardening 
standard and is compliant from security perspective. It is not enough to just meet the holding 
company security compliance requirements, therefore we need to ensure auditability of it. 
To find solution for this gap, we have reviewed related work and tools in this field. We have 
studied several open source tools that can be used for automated security compliance audit-
ing such as OpenScap, testing frameworks ServerSpec, InSpec, Rspec and audit mode in 
Chef Client. InSpec - security compliance auditing tool and testing framework that allows 
to follow DevOps approach “Compliance as Code” was chosen as it met all the requirements 
of the parent company. We have developed security compliance auditing tests for InSpec 
for automatically auditing the new OS hardening standard. Finally, we have compared our 
work with related work in security compliance auditing field. 
To validate the proof-of-concept solution, we have created two virtual machines to Azure – 
one with default (non-hardened) VM image and second with hardened VM image that we 
have built in this thesis. For validating, we have used InSpec automated security compliance 
auditing tool and InSpec controls (tests) that we have developed in this work. According to 
InSpec scan results, we discovered that 29 hardening requirements (~21%) of 138 are not 
met on VM that was created with non-hardened image. 
In this chapter, we are discussing the limitations of this work, we are answering to research 
questions and presenting the conclusions. Last but not least, the recommendations for future 
work will be presented. 
47 
 
 
7.1 Limitations 
The work done in this thesis has several limitations: 
1. The relevant hardening requirements that we have chosen for the new OS hardening 
standard is based on our understanding, experience and requirements of the parent 
company. 
2. The implemented hardening requirements are based only on one hardening guideline 
– DISA STIG for Red Hat. Validation results of other security guidelines implemen-
tation might be different.  
3. Due to limited time and resources, for implementing the proof-of-concept solution, 
we have taken only the hardening requirements in to scope that were chosen in the 
section 4.4. Therefore, we don’t have visibility whether the parent company is com-
pliant with the rest of hardening requirements. 
4. The hardened VM image that we have built in this thesis is compatible only with 
Microsoft Azure cloud. We are not introducing how to make Packer template com-
patible with other cloud providers. 
5. In this thesis, Packer build was triggered manually by human for building the hard-
ened image, we have not introduced any continuous automated build process. We 
have implemented only proof-of-concept solution for building the hardened VM im-
age. 
6. We discovered that hardened VM image building using Packer is sometimes slow 
(~10min). We had no resources to investigate the root cause of this in this thesis. 
7. Size of the hardened VM image that we have created in this thesis is 30GiB, the 
bigger the image is, the more money should be paid for storage in Azure cloud. Due 
to limited time, we did not investigate how to reduce this size. 
8. In this thesis, InSpec profile for auditing the new hardening standard was triggered 
manually by human. We have not introduced any solution for triggering it automat-
ically for continuous auditing. 
9. For validating the proof-of-concept solution, we have used only two virtual ma-
chines – one with default VM image and second with hardened VM image. Results 
could be different if validating whole server park. 
10. We have built proof-of-concept solution in this thesis, therefore it needs active test-
ing before moving to production environment. Proof-of-concept solution might have 
unnoticed issues. 
7.2 Answer to the Research Questions 
RQ1: What are the security standards and hardening guidelines for security compliance in 
industry? 
To understand security compliance and support our work in thesis, we have discovered that 
there are several security standards and hardening guidelines available such as PCI DSS, 
HIPAA, ISO (27000 series), NIST (SP800 series) and hardening guidelines provided by 
CIS, NSA, NIST and DISA. 
RQ2: How to establish Linux operating system hardening standard for security compliance? 
To establish the new Linux (Debian) operating system hardening standard for the parent 
company, we have analysed the holding company hardening standard (Appendix 1) that is 
based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). After the 
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analysis, we have identified all the relevant hardening requirements from the holding com-
pany standard for the parent company Linux Debian operating systems. We discovered that 
37 (21%) requirements of 177 were not relevant, 56 (32%) requirements were in place, 73 
(41%) requirements were not in place, but could be added easily. For the rest 11 (6%) re-
quirements the solution was not straightforward. These results allowed the author to estab-
lish the new hardening standard for the parent company that is used as a baseline for imple-
menting the proof-of-concept solution in this thesis. 
RQ3: How to implement Linux operating system hardening standard for security compli-
ance? 
To implement the hardening requirements from the new hardening standard for the parent 
company, we have decided to prepare a hardened virtual machine image for Microsoft Azure 
platform that has all these hardening requirements implemented. To not reinvent the wheel, 
we have studied related work in this field and analysed three open source tools out there that 
can be used for hardened VM image creation – Azure CLI, Azure Manage and Packer. As 
per our analysis, it was decided that Packer is the most suitable image creation tool as it met 
all the requirements of the parent company. Due to limited time and resources, we have not 
taken all hardening requirements in to scope for implementing in our proof-of-concept so-
lution. Before building the hardened image, we have prepared configuration management 
tool Chef cookbook named hardened-infra (Appendix 2) that contains all the code for auto-
matically implementing the hardening requirements from the new standard. We have used 
Test-Driven Development (Erdogmus, Morisio, & Torchiano, 2005) software development 
methodology while developing the proof-of-concept solution. For that, we have prepared 
development and testing environment using Test Kitchen (Nichol, 2017) which allowed us 
to integrate Microsoft Azure platform and configuration management tool Chef during Chef 
cookbook development. Finally, we have prepared Packer template where we integrated 
Packer with Microsoft Azure platform and Chef. As a result, we have built the new hardened 
image which is based on the new hardening standard. 
RQ4: How to audit Linux operating system hardening standard for security compliance? 
To audit the new operating system hardening standard, we have studied related work in this 
field and discovered several open source tools that can be used for automated security com-
pliance auditing – OpenScap, testing frameworks ServerSpec, InSpec, Rspec and audit 
mode in Chef Client. InSpec (Chef Software Inc, 2017a) – security compliance auditing tool 
and testing framework that allows to follow DevOps approach “Compliance as Code” was 
chosen as it met all the requirements of the parent company. We have developed security 
compliance auditing tests for InSpec for automatically auditing the new OS hardening stand-
ard (Appendix 3). 
RQ5: How many OS hardening requirements each chosen virtual machine (VM) meets from 
the new OS hardening standard? 
We have answered to this research question to validate the proof-of-concept solution that 
we have implemented in this thesis. According to InSpec scan results, we discovered that 
29 hardening requirements (~21%) of 138 were not met on virtual machine that was created 
with default (non-hardened) VM image. The hardened VM image that we have built in this 
thesis was compliant with all the hardening requirements from the new standard. Due to 
limited resources and time, these results were based only on comparing two virtual ma-
chines. Moreover, we have not taken all hardening requirements in to scope for validating 
the proof-of-concept solution. 
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7.3 Conclusions 
In this thesis, we have found answers to all research questions that we stated in the beginning 
of this work, this allowed us to achieve all our goals. We have established a new operating 
system hardening standard for the parent company Linux Debian operating systems that is 
based on DISA STIG for Red Hat (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). This new 
standard was used as a baseline for implementing the proof-of-concept solution – a hardened 
Linux Debian virtual machine image for Microsoft Azure platform that is based on the new 
hardening standard. The hardened virtual machine image was built with help of open source 
image creation tool Packer and configuration management tool Chef. Even though the new 
hardening standard was established and implemented, then there was still a gap how to prove 
to the auditors that the parent company meets the new hardening standard and is compliant 
with security requirements. For solving this gap, we have implemented a proof-of-concept 
solution using InSpec for automatically auditing the new hardening standard. To validate 
the proof-of-concept solution, we have analysed virtual machines compliance state before 
and after implementing the new operating system hardening standard.  
We have successfully built a proof-of-concept solution for the parent company that can 
be used for being compliant with the holding company security compliance require-
ments. By using this solution, we can ensure that the parent company virtual machines have 
identical hardened configurations implemented and that they are compliant with the new 
hardening standard. This is step forward that the parent company will pass internal audit of 
the holding company. 
We have learned (while studying several data breach reports and security standards in this 
thesis) that security compliances helps for achieving more security, therefore the hardened 
virtual machine image solution that we have implemented in this thesis is useful for miti-
gating and minimizing the risks of several security threats. For example, after we have val-
idated the proof-of-concept solution, we have confirmed that standard Microsoft Azure 
Linux Debian images are not built for security by default nor they are hardened against any 
security guidelines, therefore the solution that we have built in this thesis can be used as 
alternative virtual machine image for achieving more security. 
The automated continuous security compliance auditing solution that we have introduced in 
this thesis ensures that all virtual machines are hardened according to the new standard – 
any misconfiguration will be detected and fixed as soon as possible. As the parent company 
does hundreds of production changes every month then the automated security compliance 
auditing makes sure that these changes are also compliant with the new hardening standard. 
Moreover, this solution is cost effective for the company as it requires no human resources 
for collecting data for the auditors. It will also boost on-site auditing process – if evidence 
providing to the auditors of specific operating system configuration was provided manually 
before, then now it is just matter of triggering the automation (InSpec profile) and the audi-
tors will get the results automatically. 
7.4 Future Work 
For future work, it is possible to address all the limitations that we have identified in this 
thesis. In addition, it is possible to take different security standard or operating system hard-
ening guideline as a baseline and use similar solution that we have built in this thesis. More-
over, it would be interesting to see same solution for other cloud providers such as AWS, 
OpenStack and Google Cloud. Last but not least, it would be interesting to see similar solu-
tion that is implemented with using other configuration management tools such as Puppet, 
Ansible and SaltStack. 
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Appendix 
I. The Holding Company Linux Hardening Standard 
The holding company requires that the hardening requirements from DISA STIG for Red 
Hat are applied (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015). 
The hardening requirements titles (1-204) below are taken from (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015) that is published as “U_RedHat_6_V1R7_Manual-xccdf.xml” file. 
The full description of the hardening requirements and their auditing guidelines are avail-
able from (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) in “U_RedHat_6_V1R7_Manual-
xccdf.xml” file. We have described DISA STIG for Red Hat in the section 2.4. 
In the reality, the holding company standard contains several other hardening require-
ments, but in thesis we are taking only publicly available hardening requirements based on 
DISA STIG for Red Hat in to scope. 
 
1.               A file integrity tool must be installed. 
2.               A login banner must be displayed immediately prior to, or as part of, graphical 
desktop environment login prompts. 
3.               Accounts must be locked upon 35 days of inactivity. 
4.               All public directories must be owned by a system account. 
5.               All rsyslog-generated log files must be owned by root. 
6.               All system command files must be owned by root. 
7.               All system command files must have mode 0755 or less permissive. 
8.               Audit log files must be owned by root. 
9.               Audit log files must have mode 0640 or less permissive. 
10.            Auditing must be enabled at boot by setting a kernel parameter. 
11.            Automated file system mounting tools must not be enabled unless needed. 
22.            IP forwarding for IPv4 must not be enabled, unless the system is a router. 
23.            Library files must be owned by root. 
25.            Mail relaying must be restricted. 
28.            Process core dumps must be disabled unless needed. 
37.            The /etc/group file must be group-owned by root. 
38.            The /etc/group file must be owned by root. 
39.            The /etc/group file must have mode 0644 or less permissive. 
40.            The /etc/gshadow file must be group-owned by root. 
41.            The /etc/gshadow file must be owned by root. 
42.            The /etc/gshadow file must have mode 0000. 
43.            The /etc/passwd file must be group-owned by root. 
44.            The /etc/passwd file must be owned by root. 
54 
 
45.            The /etc/passwd file must have mode 0644 or less permissive. 
46.            The /etc/passwd file must not contain password hashes. 
47.            The /etc/shadow file must be group-owned by root. 
48.            The /etc/shadow file must be owned by root. 
49.            The /etc/shadow file must have mode 0000. 
50.            The atd service must be disabled. 
51.            The audit system must alert designated staff members when the audit storage 
volume approaches capacity. 
52.            The audit system must be configured to audit all attempts to alter system time 
through /etc/localtime. 
53.            The audit system must be configured to audit all attempts to alter system time 
through adjtimex. 
54.            The audit system must be configured to audit all attempts to alter system time 
through clock_settime. 
55.            The audit system must be configured to audit all attempts to alter system time 
through settimeofday. 
56.            The audit system must be configured to audit all attempts to alter system time 
through stime. 
57.            The audit system must be configured to audit all discretionary access control 
permission modifications using chmod. 
58.            The audit system must be configured to audit all discretionary access control 
permission modifications using chown. 
59.            The audit system must be configured to audit all discretionary access control 
permission modifications using fchmod. 
60.            The audit system must be configured to audit all discretionary access control 
permission modifications using fchmodat. 
61.            The audit system must be configured to audit all discretionary access control 
permission modifications using fchown. 
62.            The audit system must be configured to audit all discretionary access control 
permission modifications using fchownat. 
63.            The audit system must be configured to audit all discretionary access control 
permission modifications using fremovexattr. 
64.            The audit system must be configured to audit all discretionary access control 
permission modifications using fsetxattr. 
65.            The audit system must be configured to audit all discretionary access control 
permission modifications using lchown. 
66.            The audit system must be configured to audit all discretionary access control 
permission modifications using lremovexattr. 
67.            The audit system must be configured to audit all discretionary access control 
permission modifications using lsetxattr. 
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68.            The audit system must be configured to audit all discretionary access control 
permission modifications using removexattr. 
69.            The audit system must be configured to audit all discretionary access control 
permission modifications using setxattr. 
70.            The audit system must be configured to audit changes to the /etc/sudoers file. 
71.            The audit system must be configured to audit modifications to the systems 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) configuration (SELinux). 
72.            The audit system must be configured to audit successful file system mounts. 
73.            The audit system must be configured to audit the loading and unloading of 
dynamic kernel modules. 
74.            The audit system must be configured to audit user deletions of files and programs. 
75.            The audit system must identify staff members to receive notifications of audit log 
storage volume capacity issues. 
76.            The Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrtd) service must not be running. 
77.            The avahi service must be disabled. 
78.            The Bluetooth service must be disabled. 
79.            The cron service must be running. 
80.            The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) must be disabled unless 
required. 
81.            The DHCP client must be disabled if not needed. 
82.            The graphical desktop environment must automatically lock after 15 minutes of 
inactivity and the system must require user reauthentication to unlock the environment. 
83.            The graphical desktop environment must have automatic lock enabled. 
84.            The graphical desktop environment must set the idle timeout to no more than 15 
minutes. 
85.            The IPv6 protocol handler must not be bound to the network stack unless needed. 
86.            The netconsole service must be disabled unless required. 
87.            The ntpdate service must not be running. 
88.            The oddjobd service must not be running. 
89.            The openldap-servers package must not be installed unless required. 
90.            The operating system must automatically audit account creation. 
91.            The operating system must automatically audit account disabling actions. 
92.            The operating system must automatically audit account modification. 
93.            The operating system must automatically audit account termination. 
94.            The operating system must back up audit records on an organization defined 
frequency onto a different system or media than the system being audited. 
95.            The operating system must enforce requirements for the connection of mobile 
devices to operating systems. 
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96.            The operating system must manage information system identifiers for users and 
devices by disabling the user identifier after an organization defined time period of inactiv-
ity. 
97.            The operating system must prevent public IPv4 access into an organizations 
internal networks, except as appropriately mediated by managed interfaces employing 
boundary protection devices. 
98.            The operating system must support the requirement to centrally manage the 
content of audit records generated by organization defined information system components. 
99.            The operating system, upon successful logon/access, must display to the user the 
number of unsuccessful logon/access attempts since the last successful logon/access. 
100.         The postfix service must be enabled for mail delivery. 
101.         The qpidd service must not be running. 
102.         The rdisc service must not be running. 
103.         The Reliable Datagram Sockets (RDS) protocol must be disabled unless required. 
104.         The rexecd service must not be running. 
105.         The rlogind service must not be running. 
106.         The root account must be the only account having a UID of 0. 
107.         The rshd service must not be running. 
108.         The rsh-server package must not be installed. 
109.         The sendmail package must be removed. 
110.         The SSH daemon must be configured to use only the SSHv2 protocol. 
111.         The SSH daemon must be configured with the Department of Defense (DoD) 
login banner. 
112.         The SSH daemon must ignore .rhosts files. 
113.         The SSH daemon must not allow authentication using an empty password. 
114.         The SSH daemon must not allow host-based authentication. 
115.         The SSH daemon must not permit user environment settings. 
116.         The SSH daemon must set a timeout count on idle sessions. 
117.         The SSH daemon must set a timeout interval on idle sessions. 
118.         The sticky bit must be set on all public directories. 
119.         The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) must be disabled unless 
required. 
120.         The system boot loader configuration file(s) must be group-owned by root. 
121.         The system boot loader configuration file(s) must be owned by root. 
122.         The system boot loader configuration file(s) must have mode 0600 or less permis-
sive. 
123.         The system boot loader must require authentication. 
124.         The system clock must be synchronized continuously, or at least daily. 
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125.         The system clock must be synchronized to an authoritative DoD time source. 
126.         The system default umask for daemons must be 027 or 022. 
127.         The system default umask for the bash shell must be 077. 
128.         The system default umask for the csh shell must be 077. 
129.         The system default umask in /etc/login.defs must be 077. 
130.         The system default umask in /etc/profile must be 077. 
131.         The system must allow locking of the console screen in text mode. 
132.         The system must be configured to use TCP syncookies. 
133.         The system must disable accounts after excessive login failures within a 15-minute 
interval. 
134.         The system must disable accounts after three consecutive unsuccessful logon 
attempts. 
135.         The system must display a publicly-viewable pattern during a graphical desktop 
environment session lock. 
136.         The system must employ a local IPv4 firewall. 
137.         The system must ignore ICMPv4 bogus error responses. 
138.         The system must ignore ICMPv4 redirect messages by default. 
139.         The system must ignore ICMPv6 redirects by default. 
140.         The system must limit users to 10 simultaneous system logins, or a site-defined 
number, in accordance with operational requirements. 
141.         The system must log Martian packets. 
142.         The system must not accept ICMPv4 redirect packets on any interface. 
143.         The system must not accept ICMPv4 secure redirect packets by default. 
144.         The system must not accept ICMPv4 secure redirect packets on any interface. 
145.         The system must not accept IPv4 source-routed packets by default. 
146.         The system must not accept IPv4 source-routed packets on any interface. 
147.         The system must not have accounts configured with blank or null passwords. 
148.         The system must not permit interactive boot. 
149.         The system must not permit root logins using remote access programs such as ssh. 
150.         The system must not respond to ICMPv4 sent to a broadcast address. 
151.         The system must not send ICMPv4 redirects by default. 
152.         The system must not send ICMPv4 redirects from any interface. 
153.         The system must prevent the root account from logging in from serial consoles. 
154.         The system must prevent the root account from logging in from virtual consoles. 
155.         The system must provide VPN connectivity for communications over untrusted 
networks. 
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156.         The system must require administrator action to unlock an account locked by 
excessive failed login attempts. 
157.         The system must require at least four characters be changed between the old and 
new passwords during a password change. 
158.         The system must require authentication upon booting into single-user and mainte-
nance modes. 
159.         The system must require passwords to contain a minimum of 14 characters. 
160.         The system must require passwords to contain at least one lowercase alphabetic 
character. 
161.         The system must require passwords to contain at least one numeric character. 
162.         The system must require passwords to contain at least one special character. 
163.         The system must require passwords to contain at least one uppercase alphabetic 
character. 
164.         The system must retain enough rotated audit logs to cover the required log retention 
period. 
165.         The system must rotate audit log files that reach the maximum file size. 
166.         The system must set a maximum audit log file size. 
167.         The system must use a FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic hashing algorithm for 
generating account password hashes (libuser.conf). 
168.         The system must use a FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic hashing algorithm for 
generating account password hashes (login.defs). 
169.         The system must use a FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic hashing algorithm for 
generating account password hashes (system-auth). 
170.         The system must use a Linux Security Module at boot time. 
171.         The system must use a Linux Security Module configured to enforce limits on 
system services. 
172.         The system must use a Linux Security Module configured to limit the privileges 
of system services. 
173.         The system must use a reverse-path filter for IPv4 network traffic when possible 
by default. 
174.         The system must use a reverse-path filter for IPv4 network traffic when possible 
on all interfaces. 
175.         The system must use a separate file system for /tmp. 
176.         The system must use a separate file system for /var. 
177.         The system must use a separate file system for /var/log. 
178.         The system must use a separate file system for the system audit data path. 
179.         The system must use a separate file system for user home directories. 
180.         The system must use SMB client signing for connecting to samba servers using 
smbclient. 
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181.         The system package management tool must cryptographically verify the authen-
ticity of all software packages during installation. 
182.         The system package management tool must cryptographically verify the authen-
ticity of system software packages during installation. 
183.         The systems local IPv4 firewall must implement a deny-all, allow-by-exception 
policy for inbound packets. 
184.         The telnet daemon must not be running. 
185.         The telnet-server package must not be installed. 
186.         The TFTP daemon must operate in secure mode which provides access only to a 
single directory on the host file system. 
187.         The tftp-server package must not be installed. 
188.         The Transparent Inter-Process Communication (TIPC) protocol must be disabled 
unless required. 
189.         The xinetd service must be disabled if no network services utilizing it are enabled. 
190.         The xinetd service must be uninstalled if no network services utilizing it are 
enabled. 
191.         The xorg-x11-server-common (X Windows) package must not be installed, unless 
required. 
192.         The ypbind service must not be running. 
193.         The ypserv package must not be installed. 
194.         There must be no .rhosts or hosts.equiv files on the system. 
197.         User passwords must be changed at least every 60 days. 
198.         Users must be warned 7 days in advance of password expiration. 
199.         Users must not be able to change passwords more than once every 24 hours. 
204.         X Windows must not be enabled unless required. 
(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) 
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II. Chef Cookbook for Implementing the New Hardening Standard 
There are 6 recipes for each hardening requirement group in the section 4.4. The Chef cook-
book hardened-infra project file tree overview: 
hardened-infra 
├── attributes 
├── CHANGELOG.md 
├── files 
│   └── default 
│       └── banner 
├── .kitchen 
│   ├── default-debian-7.yml 
│   └── logs 
│       ├── default-debian-7.log 
│       ├── default-debian-8.log 
│       ├── default-ubuntu-1404.log 
│       └── kitchen.log 
├── .kitchen.yml 
├── metadata.rb 
├── README.md 
├── recipes 
│   ├── 1_filepermissions.rb 
│   ├── 3_sshd.rb 
│   ├── 4_sysctls.rb 
│   ├── 5_packages.rb 
│   ├── 6_services.rb 
│   ├── 7_protocols.rb 
│   └── default.rb 
├── .rubocop.yml 
├── templates 
│   └── default 
│       ├── common-session.erb 
│       ├── login.defs.erb 
│       ├── protocols.conf.erb 
│       ├── sshd_config.erb 
│       └── sysctl.conf.erb 
└── test 
    └── integration 
        └── default 
            ├── controls 
            │   ├── 1_filepermissions.rb 
            │   ├── 3_sshd.rb 
            │   ├── 4_sysctls.rb 
            │   ├── 5_packages.rb 
            │   ├── 6_services.rb 
            │   ├── 7_protocols.rb 
            │   └── inspec.lock 
            ├── inspec.yml 
            ├── .kitchen 
            │   └── logs 
            │       └── kitchen.log 
            ├── libraries 
            │   └── .gitkeep 
            └── README.md 
 
15 directories, 34 files 
 
While developing and implementing the hardening requirements, we have used DISA STIG 
for Red Hat (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) guidelines and recommendatios 
where possible. 
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Chef recipes 
Default.rb: 
# Make sure that image has latest DSA packages 
execute 'aptupgrade' do 
  command 'apt-get update; apt-get upgrade --force-yes -y' 
  action :run 
end 
 
# Harden our infrastructure 
include_recipe 'hardened-infra::1_filepermissions' 
include_recipe 'hardened-infra::3_sshd' 
include_recipe 'hardened-infra::4_sysctls' 
include_recipe 'hardened-infra::5_packages' 
include_recipe 'hardened-infra::6_services' 
include_recipe 'hardened-infra::7_protocols' 
1_filepermissions.rb: 
# 1. Secure file and directory permissions and ownership 
 
# All syslog-ng generated log files owned by root (req. 5) 
# We don't use rsyslog, remove it 
package 'rsyslog' do 
  action :purge 
end 
# Install syslog-ng instead 
package 'syslog-ng' do 
  action :install 
end 
 
# NOTE: permissions should be fixed in syslog-ng.conf as well 
['auth.log', 'cron.log', 'daemon.log', 'kern.log', 'lpr.log', 'mail.log', 
 'syslog', 'user.log', 'uucp.log', 'messages' 
].each do |logfile| 
  next unless File.exist?("/var/log/#{logfile}") 
  file "/var/log/#{logfile}" do 
    owner 'root' 
    mode 00640 
  end 
end 
 
# Stricter mode for password, shadow and group files - owned by root, mode 0640 
# or less (req. 37-49) 
['/etc/group', '/etc/gshadow', '/etc/passwd', '/etc/shadow'].each do |file| 
  file file.to_s do 
    mode '0640' 
    owner 'root' 
    group 'root' 
  end 
end 
 
# Bootloader configuration files owned by root, mode 0600 (req. 120-122) 
['/boot/extlinux/extlinux.conf', '/boot/extlinux/linux.cfg', 
 '/boot/extlinux/memdisk.cfg', '/boot/grub/menu.lst', '/etc/grub.conf', 
 '/boot/grub/grub.conf' 
].each do |file| 
  next unless File.exist?(file.to_s) 
  file file.to_s do 
    mode '0600' 
    owner 'root' 
    group 'root' 
  end 
end 
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# Secure umask is set by default for both users and daemons (req. 126-127,129) 
# Debian ship with pam_umask. This allows to configure umask in /etc/login.defs 
# and have it applied on whole system. 
template "/etc/login.defs" do 
  source "login.defs.erb" 
end 
 
template "/etc/pam.d/common-session" do 
  source "common-session.erb" 
end 
3_sshd.rb: 
# 3. Secure SSHD configuration 
 
template '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' do 
  source 'sshd_config.erb' 
  notifies :restart, 'service[ssh]', :delayed 
end 
 
cookbook_file '/etc/banner' do 
  source 'banner' 
  owner 'root' 
  group 'root' 
  mode 00644 
  notifies :restart, 'service[ssh]', :delayed 
end 
 
service 'ssh' do 
  service_name 'ssh' 
  supports [:restart, :reload, :status] 
  action [:enable, :start] 
end 
4_sysctls.rb 
# 4. Secure kernel (sysctls) configuration 
 
template "/etc/sysctl.conf" do 
  source "sysctl.conf.erb" 
  owner "root" 
  group "root" 
  mode 0644 
  notifies :run, "execute[reload-sysctl]", :immediately 
end 
 
execute "reload-sysctl" do 
  command "sysctl -p" 
  action :nothing 
end 
7_protocols.rb 
 
# 7. Security related to protocols 
 
# Remove not needed kernel module 
blacklist = %w(dccp rds sctp tipc ipv6 netconsole) 
blacklist.each do |kmodule| 
  execute "Remove kernel module #{kmodule}" do 
    command "modprobe -r #{kmodule}" 
    action :run 
    only_if "grep -q '^#{kmodule} ' /proc/modules" 
  end 
end 
 
# Stop loading kernel module during startup 
template '/etc/modprobe.d/protocols.conf' do 
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  source 'protocols.conf.erb' 
  owner 'root' 
  group 'root' 
  mode 00744 
  variables( 
    dmod: blacklist 
  ) 
end 
 
Chef templates 
We have taken default configuration files as a baseline that are available in default VM 
image for Debian in Azure. While developing Chef cookbook, we have used DISA STIG for 
Red Hat (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) guidelines where possible (for 
SSHD, Sysctl and umask settings). 
sshd_config.erb: 
# Generated by Chef 
 
Port 22 
# Display login banner (req. 2, 111) 
Banner /etc/banner 
# Only protocol version 2 is allowed (req. 110) 
Protocol 2 
# Ignore .rhosts files (req. 112) 
IgnoreRhosts yes 
# Do not allow host-based authentication and authentication using an empty pass-
word (req. 113-114) 
HostbasedAuthentication no 
PermitEmptyPasswords no 
# Do not permit user environment settings (req. 115) 
PermitUserEnvironment no 
# Idle timeout is enforced, set for 15 minutes (req. 116-117) 
ClientAliveCountMax 0 
ClientAliveInterval 900 
# Root login is disabled (req. 149) 
PermitRootLogin no 
# Password based authentication is disabled (extra req.) 
PasswordAuthentication no 
# Other SSHD configuration parameters that are not in scope of this thesis (pa-
rameters and its vales below are default ones of SSHD that is shipped with 
Debian VM image in Azure) 
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key 
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key 
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key 
UsePrivilegeSeparation yes 
KeyRegenerationInterval 3600 
ServerKeyBits 768 
SyslogFacility AUTH 
LogLevel INFO 
LoginGraceTime 120 
StrictModes yes 
RSAAuthentication yes 
PubkeyAuthentication yes 
RhostsRSAAuthentication no 
X11Forwarding no 
X11DisplayOffset 10 
PrintMotd no 
PrintLastLog yes 
TCPKeepAlive yes 
AcceptEnv LANG LC_* 
Subsystem sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server 
UsePAM yes 
ChallengeResponseAuthentication no 
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sysctl.conf.erb: 
Recommended Sysctl parameters and its values are taken from (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015). 
# Generated by Chef 
net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0 
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1 
net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1 
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0 
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0 
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1 
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0 
net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0 
net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0 
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0 
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0 
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1 
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0 
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0 
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1 
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1 
# disable ipv6 
net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1 
net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1 
net.ipv6.conf.lo.disable_ipv6 = 1 
protocols.conf.erb: 
# Generated by Chef 
<% @dmod.each do |h| -%> 
install <%= h %> /bin/false 
<% end -%> 
options ipv6 disable=1 
login.defs.erb: 
# Generated by Chef 
MAIL_DIR        /var/mail 
FAILLOG_ENAB            yes 
LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB        no 
LOG_OK_LOGINS           no 
SYSLOG_SU_ENAB          yes 
SYSLOG_SG_ENAB          yes 
FTMP_FILE       /var/log/btmp 
SU_NAME         su 
HUSHLOGIN_FILE  .hushlogin 
ENV_SUPATH      PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/lo-
cal/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin 
ENV_PATH        PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/local/games:/usr/games 
TTYGROUP        tty 
TTYPERM         0600 
ERASECHAR       0177 
KILLCHAR        025 
UMASK           077 
PASS_MAX_DAYS   99999 
PASS_MIN_DAYS   0 
PASS_WARN_AGE   7 
UID_MIN                  1000 
UID_MAX                 60000 
GID_MIN                  1000 
GID_MAX                 60000 
LOGIN_RETRIES           5 
LOGIN_TIMEOUT           60 
CHFN_RESTRICT           rwh 
DEFAULT_HOME    yes 
USERGROUPS_ENAB yes 
ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512 
65 
 
common-session.rb: 
# Generated by Chef 
session [default=1]                     pam_permit.so 
session requisite                       pam_deny.so 
session required                        pam_permit.so 
session required                        pam_unix.so 
session optional                        pam_winbind.so 
session optional                        pam_ck_connector.so nox11 
session optional                        pam_umask.so 
 
The hardened-infra/test/integration/default/controls directory is used for integration tests 
that we use while developing the OS hardening requirements in to Chef cookbook. These 
InSpec tests are also used for security compliance auditing and we are describing these in 
Appendix 3. 
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III. InSpec Profile for Auditing the New Hardening Standard 
We have created InSpec controls (tests) and integrated it with Test Kitchen. For Chef cook-
book development, we have added InSpec controls (tests) to the hardened-infra/test/inte-
gration/default/controls directory as follows:  
hardened-infra/test 
└── integration 
    └── default 
        ├── controls 
        │   ├── 1_filepermissions.rb 
        │   ├── 3_sshd.rb 
        │   ├── 4_sysctls.rb 
        │   ├── 5_packages.rb 
        │   ├── 6_services.rb 
        │   ├── 7_protocols.rb 
        │   └── inspec.lock 
        ├── inspec.yml 
        ├── .kitchen 
        │   └── logs 
        │       └── kitchen.log 
        ├── libraries 
        │   └── .gitkeep 
        └── README.md 
InSpec profile overview. This profile is used for executing the included controls (tests) on 
any remote server via SSH and get the results automatically: 
inspec-hardened-infra 
├── controls 
│   ├── 1_filepermissions.rb 
│   ├── 3_sshd.rb 
│   ├── 4_sysctls.rb 
│   ├── 5_packages.rb 
│   ├── 6_services.rb 
│   ├── 7_protocols.rb 
│   └── example.rb 
├── inspec.yml 
├── libraries 
│   └── .gitkeep 
└── README.md 
 
2 directories, 10 files 
 
While developing security compliance auditing tests, we have used DISA STIG for Red Hat 
(Defense Information Systems Agency, 2015) auditing guidelines where possible, such as 
Linux commands what to execute for verifying if specific security requirement has been im-
plemented (For example, find commands that are using InSpec command resource below in 
1_filepermission.rb). 
1_filepermissions.rb: 
# 1. Secure file and directory permissions and ownership 
 
control '1. Secure file and directory permissions and ownership' do 
  impact 1.0 
  title 'Only secure file and directory permissions and ownership should be 
used' 
  # Correct owner for public directories 
  describe command('find / -xdev -type d -perm -0002 -uid +499 -print') do 
    its('stdout') { should eq '' } 
  end 
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  # All syslog-ng generated log files owned by root (req. 5) 
  ['auth.log', 'cron.log', 'daemon.log', 'kern.log', 'lpr.log', 'mail.log', 
   'syslog', 'user.log', 'uucp.log', 'messages' 
  ].each do |logfile| 
    next unless file("/var/log/#{logfile}").exist? 
    describe file("/var/log/#{logfile}") do 
      its('owner') { should eq 'root' } 
    end 
  end 
  # System command files owned by root, have mode 0755 or less permissive (req. 
6,7) 
  ['/bin', '/usr/bin', '/usr/local/bin', '/sbin', '/usr/sbin', '/usr/local/sbin' 
  ].each do |dir| 
    describe command("find -L #{dir} \! -user root") do 
      its('stdout') { should eq '' } 
    end 
    describe command("find -L #{dir} -perm /022 -type f") do 
      its('stdout') { should eq '' } 
    end 
  end 
  # Shared libraries owned by root (req. 23) 
  ['/lib', '/lib64', '/usr/lib', '/usr/lib64'].each do |library| 
    describe command("find -L #{library} \! -user root") do 
      its('stdout') { should eq '' } 
    end 
  end 
  # Stricter mode for password, shadow and group files - owned by root, mode 
0640 or less (req. 37-49) 
  ['/etc/group', '/etc/gshadow', '/etc/passwd', '/etc/shadow'].each do |file| 
    describe file(file.to_s) do 
      it { should be_owned_by 'root' } 
      its('group') { should eq 'root' } 
      its('mode') { should cmp '00640' } 
    end 
  end 
  # The /etc/passwd file must not contain password hashes (req. 46) 
  describe passwd.passwords(/^(?!x$)/) do 
    its('entries.length') { should be == 0 } 
  end 
  # Sticky bits for public writable directories (req. 118) 
  describe command('find / -xdev -type d -perm -002 ! -perm -1000') do 
    its('stdout') { should eq '' } 
  end 
  # Bootloader configuration files owned by root, mode 0600 (req. 120-122) 
  # We use extlinux in Azure, Grub is used on some places as well 
  ['/boot/extlinux/extlinux.conf', '/boot/extlinux/linux.cfg', 
   '/boot/extlinux/memdisk.cfg', '/boot/grub/menu.lst', '/etc/grub.conf', 
   '/boot/grub/grub.conf' 
  ].each do |file| 
    next unless file(file.to_s).exist? 
    describe file(file.to_s) do 
      its('owner') { should eq 'root' } 
      its('group') { should eq 'root' } 
      its('mode') { should cmp '00600' } 
    end 
  end 
  # Secure umask is set by default for users and daemons (req. 126-127,129) 
  describe file('/etc/init.d/rc') do 
    its('content') { should match /^umask 022|umask 027$/ } 
  end 
# Debian ship with pam_umask. This allows to configure umask in /etc/login.defs 
# and have it applied everywhere on the system 
  describe file('/etc/pam.d/common-session') do 
    its('content') { should include 'pam_umask.so' } 
  end 
  describe login_defs do 
    its('UMASK') { should eq '077' } 
  end 
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end 
4_sysctls.rb: 
control '4. Secure kernel (sysctls) configuration' do 
  impact 1.0 
  title 'Only approved kernel parameters should be used' 
  enabled_param = %w( 
    net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies 
    net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses 
    net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians 
    net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts 
    net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter 
    net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter 
    net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 
    net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 
    net.ipv6.conf.lo.disable_ipv6) 
  disabled_param = %w( 
    net.ipv4.ip_forward 
    net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects 
    net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects 
    net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects 
    net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects 
    net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects 
    net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route 
    net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route 
    net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects 
    net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects) 
  # Enabled kernel params 
  enabled_param.each do |eparam| 
    describe kernel_parameter(eparam.to_s) do 
      its('value') { should eq 1 } 
    end 
  end 
  # Disabled kernel params 
  disabled_param.each do |dparam| 
    describe kernel_parameter(dparam.to_s) do 
      its('value') { should eq 0 } 
    end 
  end 
end 
6_services.rb: 
control '6. Security related to services' do 
  impact 1.0 
  title 'Only approved servcices are allowed' 
  blacklist = %w( 
    autofs 
    atd 
    avahi-daemon 
    bluetooth 
    ntpdate 
    oddjobd 
    qpidd 
    xinetd 
    openbsd-inetd 
    nis) 
  whitelist = %w(cron) 
  # Not allowed packages 
  blacklist.each do |stopservice| 
    describe service(stopservice.to_s) do 
      it { should_not be_installed } 
      it { should_not be_enabled } 
      it { should_not be_running } 
    end 
  end 
  # Allowed packages 
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  whitelist.each do |startservice| 
    describe service(startservice.to_s) do 
      it { should be_installed } 
      it { should be_enabled } 
      it { should be_running } 
    end 
  end 
  # The following services should be also not running. In Debian they are 
  # shipped by rsh-server and nis package. 
  # rexec, rlogind etc is shipped by rsh-server package in Debian and it 
  # executed via inetd, let's make sure that these binaries do not exist 
  ['in.rexecd', 'in.rlogind', 'in.rshd', 'in.telnetd', 'ypbind', 'ypserv', 
   'in.rdisc' 
  ].each do |binaries| 
    describe file('/usr/sbin/' + binaries.to_s) do 
      it { should_not exist } 
    end 
  end 
end 
7_protocols.rb: 
control '7. Security related to protocols' do 
  impact 1.0 
  title 'Only approved protocols are allowed' 
  blacklist = %w(dccp rds sctp tipc ipv6 netconsole) 
  # Not allowed kernel modules 
  blacklist.each do |rkmod| 
    describe kernel_module(rkmod.to_s) do 
      it { should_not be_loaded } 
    end 
  end 
  # ipv6 should be disabled for all interfaces 
  describe file('/proc/net/if_inet6') do 
    its('size') { should eq 0 } 
  end 
end 
 
70 
 
IV. Results of Validating the Proof of Concept Solution 
Automated security compliance auditing results based on one virtual machine that is created 
with non-hardened VM image: 
inspec exec controls/ -t ssh://martin@<ip> –sudo 
 
Target:  ssh://martin@<ip>:22 
 
  ×  3. Secure SSHD configuration: Only approved SSH parameters are allowed (6 
failed) 
     ✔  SSH Configuration Protocol should eq "2" 
     ×  SSH Configuration Banner should eq "/etc/banner" 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: "/etc/banner"                                                                                                                                                                                        
          got: nil                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ✔  SSH Configuration IgnoreRhosts should eq "yes" 
     ✔  SSH Configuration PermitEmptyPasswords should eq "no" 
     ✔  SSH Configuration HostbasedAuthentication should eq "no" 
     ×  SSH Configuration PermitUserEnvironment should eq "no" 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: "no"                                                                                                                                                                                                 
          got: nil                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ×  SSH Configuration ClientAliveCountMax should eq "0" 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: "0"                                                                                                                                                                                                  
          got: nil                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ×  SSH Configuration ClientAliveInterval should eq "900" 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: "900"                                                                                                                                                                                                
          got: "120"                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ×  SSH Configuration PermitRootLogin should eq "no" 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: "no"                                                                                                                                                                                                 
          got: "without-password"                                                                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ✔  SSH Configuration PasswordAuthentication should eq "no" 
     ×  File /etc/banner should exist 
     expected File /etc/banner to exist                                                                                                                                                                             
  ✔  7. Security related to protocols: Only approved protocols are allowed 
     ✔  Kernel Module dccp should not be loaded 
     ✔  Kernel Module rds should not be loaded 
     ✔  Kernel Module sctp should not be loaded 
     ✔  Kernel Module tipc should not be loaded 
     ✔  Kernel Module ipv6 should not be loaded 
     ✔  Kernel Module netconsole should not be loaded 
     ✔  File /proc/net/if_inet6 size should eq 0 
  ✔  6. Security related to services: Only approved servcices are allowed 
     ✔  Service autofs should not be installed 
     ✔  Service autofs should not be enabled 
71 
 
     ✔  Service autofs should not be running 
     ✔  Service atd should not be installed 
     ✔  Service atd should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service atd should not be running 
     ✔  Service avahi-daemon should not be installed 
     ✔  Service avahi-daemon should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service avahi-daemon should not be running 
     ✔  Service bluetooth should not be installed 
     ✔  Service bluetooth should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service bluetooth should not be running 
     ✔  Service ntpdate should not be installed 
     ✔  Service ntpdate should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service ntpdate should not be running 
     ✔  Service oddjobd should not be installed 
     ✔  Service oddjobd should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service oddjobd should not be running 
     ✔  Service qpidd should not be installed 
     ✔  Service qpidd should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service qpidd should not be running 
     ✔  Service xinetd should not be installed 
     ✔  Service xinetd should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service xinetd should not be running 
     ✔  Service openbsd-inetd should not be installed 
     ✔  Service openbsd-inetd should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service openbsd-inetd should not be running 
     ✔  Service nis should not be installed 
     ✔  Service nis should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service nis should not be running 
     ✔  Service cron should be installed 
     ✔  Service cron should be enabled 
     ✔  Service cron should be running 
     ✔  File /usr/sbin/in.rexecd should not exist 
     ✔  File /usr/sbin/in.rlogind should not exist 
     ✔  File /usr/sbin/in.rshd should not exist 
     ✔  File /usr/sbin/in.telnetd should not exist 
     ✔  File /usr/sbin/ypbind should not exist 
     ✔  File /usr/sbin/ypserv should not exist 
     ✔  File /usr/sbin/in.rdisc should not exist 
  ×  1. Secure file and directory permissions and ownership: Only secure file 
and directory permissions and ownership should be used (8 failed) 
     ✔  Command find / -xdev -type d -perm -0002 -uid +499 -print stdout should 
eq "" 
     ✔  File /var/log/auth.log owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/daemon.log owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/kern.log owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/lpr.log owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/mail.log owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/syslog owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/user.log owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/messages owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  Command find -L /bin ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /bin -perm /022 -type f stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/bin ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/bin -perm /022 -type f stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/local/bin ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/local/bin -perm /022 -type f stdout should eq "" 
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     ✔  Command find -L /sbin ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /sbin -perm /022 -type f stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/sbin ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/sbin -perm /022 -type f stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/local/sbin ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/local/sbin -perm /022 -type f stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /lib ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /lib64 ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/lib ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/lib64 ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  File /etc/group should be owned by "root" 
     ✔  File /etc/group group should eq "root" 
     ×  File /etc/group mode should cmp == "00640" 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: "00640"                                                                                                                                                                                              
          got: "0644"                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using `cmp` matcher)                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ✔  File /etc/gshadow should be owned by "root" 
     ×  File /etc/gshadow group should eq "root" 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: "root"                                                                                                                                                                                               
          got: "shadow"                                                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ✔  File /etc/gshadow mode should cmp == "00640" 
     ✔  File /etc/passwd should be owned by "root" 
     ✔  File /etc/passwd group should eq "root" 
     ×  File /etc/passwd mode should cmp == "00640" 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: "00640"                                                                                                                                                                                              
          got: "0644"                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using `cmp` matcher)                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ✔  File /etc/shadow should be owned by "root" 
     ✔  File /etc/shadow group should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /etc/shadow mode should cmp == "00640" 
     ✔  /etc/passwd with password == /^(?!x$)/ entries.length should be == 0 
     ✔  Command find / -xdev -type d -perm -002 ! -perm -1000 stdout should eq 
"" 
     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/extlinux.conf owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/extlinux.conf group should eq "root" 
     ×  File /boot/extlinux/extlinux.conf mode should cmp == "00600" 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: "00600"                                                                                                                                                                                              
          got: "0644"                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using `cmp` matcher)                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/linux.cfg owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/linux.cfg group should eq "root" 
     ×  File /boot/extlinux/linux.cfg mode should cmp == "00600" 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: "00600"                                                                                                                                                                                              
          got: "0644"                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using `cmp` matcher)                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/memdisk.cfg owner should eq "root" 
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     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/memdisk.cfg group should eq "root" 
     ×  File /boot/extlinux/memdisk.cfg mode should cmp == "00600" 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: "00600"                                                                                                                                                                                              
          got: "0644"                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using `cmp` matcher)                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ✔  File /etc/init.d/rc content should match /^umask 022|umask 027$/ 
     ×  File /etc/pam.d/common-session content should include "pam_umask.so" 
     expected "#\n# /etc/pam.d/common-session - session-related modules common 
to all services\n#\n# This file is i...ules (the \"Additional\" block)\nses-
sion\trequired\tpam_unix.so \n# end of pam-auth-update config\n" to include 
"pam_umask.so"                                                                                                                                                                                   
     ×  login.defs UMASK should eq "077" 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: "077"                                                                                                                                                                                                
          got: "022"                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
  ×  5. Security related to packages: Only approved packages are allowed (1 
failed) 
     ✔  System Package slapd should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package rsh-server should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package sendmail should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package telnetd should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package tftpd-hpa should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package xinetd should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package openbsd-inetd should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package xserver-xorg should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package nis should not be installed 
     ×  System Package samhain should be installed 
     expected that `System Package samhain` is installed                                                                                                                                                            
  ×  4. Secure kernel (sysctls) configuration: Only approved kernel parameters 
should be used (14 failed) 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies value should eq 1 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses value should 
eq 1 
     ×  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians value should eq 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: 1                                                                                                                                                                                                    
          got: 0                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts value should eq 1 
     ×  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter value should eq 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: 1                                                                                                                                                                                                    
          got: 0                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ×  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter value should eq 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: 1                                                                                                                                                                                                    
          got: 0                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ×  Kernel Parameter net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 value should eq 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: 1                                                                                                                                                                                                    
          got: 0                                                                                                                                                                                                    
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     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ×  Kernel Parameter net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 value should eq 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: 1                                                                                                                                                                                                    
          got: 0                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ×  Kernel Parameter net.ipv6.conf.lo.disable_ipv6 value should eq 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: 1                                                                                                                                                                                                    
          got: 0                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.ip_forward value should eq 0 
     ×  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects value should eq 
0 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: 0                                                                                                                                                                                                    
          got: 1                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ×  Kernel Parameter net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects value should eq 
0 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: 0                                                                                                                                                                                                    
          got: 1                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     (compared using ==)                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     ×  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects value should eq 0 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
     expected: 0 
          got: 1 
      
     (compared using ==) 
      
     ×  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects value should eq 
0 
      
     expected: 0 
          got: 1 
      
     (compared using ==) 
      
     ×  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects value should eq 0 
      
     expected: 0 
          got: 1 
      
     (compared using ==) 
      
     ×  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route value should 
eq 0 
      
     expected: 0 
          got: 1 
      
     (compared using ==) 
      
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route value should eq 0 
     ×  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects value should eq 0 
      
     expected: 0 
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          got: 1 
      
     (compared using ==) 
      
     ×  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects value should eq 0 
      
     expected: 0 
          got: 1 
      
     (compared using ==) 
      
 
Profile Summary: 2 successful, 4 failures, 0 skipped 
Test Summary: 109 successful, 29 failures, 0 skipped 
 
Automated security compliance auditing results based on one virtual machine that is created 
with hardened VM image: 
inspec exec controls/ -t ssh://martin@<ip> --sudo 
Target:  ssh://martin@<ip>:22 
 
  ✔  3. Secure SSHD configuration: Only approved SSH parameters are allowed 
     ✔  SSH Configuration Protocol should eq "2" 
     ✔  SSH Configuration Banner should eq "/etc/banner" 
     ✔  SSH Configuration IgnoreRhosts should eq "yes" 
     ✔  SSH Configuration PermitEmptyPasswords should eq "no" 
     ✔  SSH Configuration HostbasedAuthentication should eq "no" 
     ✔  SSH Configuration PermitUserEnvironment should eq "no" 
     ✔  SSH Configuration ClientAliveCountMax should eq "0" 
     ✔  SSH Configuration ClientAliveInterval should eq "900" 
     ✔  SSH Configuration PermitRootLogin should eq "no" 
     ✔  SSH Configuration PasswordAuthentication should eq "no" 
     ✔  File /etc/banner should exist 
  ✔  7. Security related to protocols: Only approved protocols are allowed 
     ✔  Kernel Module dccp should not be loaded 
     ✔  Kernel Module rds should not be loaded 
     ✔  Kernel Module sctp should not be loaded 
     ✔  Kernel Module tipc should not be loaded 
     ✔  Kernel Module ipv6 should not be loaded 
     ✔  Kernel Module netconsole should not be loaded 
     ✔  File /proc/net/if_inet6 size should eq 0 
  ✔  6. Security related to services: Only approved servcices are allowed 
     ✔  Service autofs should not be installed 
     ✔  Service autofs should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service autofs should not be running 
     ✔  Service atd should not be installed 
     ✔  Service atd should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service atd should not be running 
     ✔  Service avahi-daemon should not be installed 
     ✔  Service avahi-daemon should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service avahi-daemon should not be running 
     ✔  Service bluetooth should not be installed 
     ✔  Service bluetooth should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service bluetooth should not be running 
     ✔  Service ntpdate should not be installed 
     ✔  Service ntpdate should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service ntpdate should not be running 
     ✔  Service oddjobd should not be installed 
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     ✔  Service oddjobd should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service oddjobd should not be running 
     ✔  Service qpidd should not be installed 
     ✔  Service qpidd should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service qpidd should not be running 
     ✔  Service xinetd should not be installed 
     ✔  Service xinetd should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service xinetd should not be running 
     ✔  Service openbsd-inetd should not be installed 
     ✔  Service openbsd-inetd should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service openbsd-inetd should not be running 
     ✔  Service nis should not be installed 
     ✔  Service nis should not be enabled 
     ✔  Service nis should not be running 
     ✔  Service cron should be installed 
     ✔  Service cron should be enabled 
     ✔  Service cron should be running 
     ✔  File /usr/sbin/in.rexecd should not exist 
     ✔  File /usr/sbin/in.rlogind should not exist 
     ✔  File /usr/sbin/in.rshd should not exist 
     ✔  File /usr/sbin/in.telnetd should not exist 
     ✔  File /usr/sbin/ypbind should not exist 
     ✔  File /usr/sbin/ypserv should not exist 
     ✔  File /usr/sbin/in.rdisc should not exist 
  ✔  1. Secure file and directory permissions and ownership: Only secure file 
and directory permissions and ownership should be used 
     ✔  Command find / -xdev -type d -perm -0002 -uid +499 -print stdout should 
eq "" 
     ✔  File /var/log/auth.log owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/cron.log owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/daemon.log owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/kern.log owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/lpr.log owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/mail.log owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/syslog owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/user.log owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /var/log/messages owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  Command find -L /bin ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /bin -perm /022 -type f stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/bin ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/bin -perm /022 -type f stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/local/bin ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/local/bin -perm /022 -type f stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /sbin ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /sbin -perm /022 -type f stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/sbin ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/sbin -perm /022 -type f stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/local/sbin ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/local/sbin -perm /022 -type f stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /lib ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /lib64 ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/lib ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  Command find -L /usr/lib64 ! -user root stdout should eq "" 
     ✔  File /etc/group should be owned by "root" 
     ✔  File /etc/group group should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /etc/group mode should cmp == "00640" 
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     ✔  File /etc/gshadow should be owned by "root" 
     ✔  File /etc/gshadow group should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /etc/gshadow mode should cmp == "00640" 
     ✔  File /etc/passwd should be owned by "root" 
     ✔  File /etc/passwd group should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /etc/passwd mode should cmp == "00640" 
     ✔  File /etc/shadow should be owned by "root" 
     ✔  File /etc/shadow group should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /etc/shadow mode should cmp == "00640" 
     ✔  /etc/passwd with password == /^(?!x$)/ entries.length should be == 0 
     ✔  Command find / -xdev -type d -perm -002 ! -perm -1000 stdout should eq 
"" 
     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/extlinux.conf owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/extlinux.conf group should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/extlinux.conf mode should cmp == "00600" 
     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/linux.cfg owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/linux.cfg group should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/linux.cfg mode should cmp == "00600" 
     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/memdisk.cfg owner should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/memdisk.cfg group should eq "root" 
     ✔  File /boot/extlinux/memdisk.cfg mode should cmp == "00600" 
     ✔  File /etc/init.d/rc content should match /^umask 022|umask 027$/ 
     ✔  File /etc/pam.d/common-session content should include "pam_umask.so" 
     ✔  login.defs UMASK should eq "077" 
  ✔  5. Security related to packages: Only approved packages are allowed 
     ✔  System Package slapd should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package rsh-server should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package sendmail should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package telnetd should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package tftpd-hpa should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package xinetd should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package openbsd-inetd should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package xserver-xorg should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package nis should not be installed 
     ✔  System Package samhain should be installed 
  ✔  4. Secure kernel (sysctls) configuration: Only approved kernel parameters 
should be used 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies value should eq 1 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses value should 
eq 1 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians value should eq 1 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts value should eq 1 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter value should eq 1 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter value should eq 1 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 value should eq 1 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 value should eq 1 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv6.conf.lo.disable_ipv6 value should eq 1 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.ip_forward value should eq 0 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects value should eq 
0 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects value should eq 
0 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects value should eq 0 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects value should eq 
0 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects value should eq 0 
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     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route value should 
eq 0 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route value should eq 0 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects value should eq 0 
     ✔  Kernel Parameter net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects value should eq 0 
 
Profile Summary: 6 successful, 0 failures, 0 skipped 
Test Summary: 138 successful, 0 failures, 0 skipped 
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